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I. Introduction
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,1 the United States Supreme Court established 
substantive limitations to state taxation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause2 and under the Commerce Clause’s negative sweep.3 Quill is recognized as the 
principal and preeminent statement of these important Constitutional principles limiting 
state taxing jurisdiction and authority.4
Certainly, states often view restrictions on their taxing authority as unwelcome.5
A recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut represents the most extreme of 
these cases.  In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin,6 the Supreme Court of Connecticut7
upheld the imposition of Connecticut income taxes on a New York trustee.8 The trustee 
 
1 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91, (1992). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
3 Quill, 504 U.S. at 309. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, (1824) 
(recognizing the negative power of the Commerce Clause). 
4 See, e.g., Scholastic Book Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d. 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); 
Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 562 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Town Crier, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 733 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).  
5 See, e.g., Blue, infra at Note 118; John Caher, State Tax Ruling Roils Controversy with Neighbors,
N.Y.L.J., (2001) (analyzing a fight between New York and Connecticut over allocation of a Connecticut 
resident's salary from a New York University).  See Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, Interstate 
Style:  First Notes on a Theme from Saenz, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133 (2002). 
6 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 249 Conn. 172, 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999) (referenced in this article as 
“Gavin”). 
7 Concurring in Justice Borden’s opinion were Justices Callahan, Norcott, Palmer, and Peters.  Justices 
McDonald and Berdon dissented. Id. at 806.  
8 The case involved taxation of four testamentary trusts of Connecticut decedents and one inter vivos trust 
(the Adolffson Trust) established by a Connecticut resident as settlor.  The testamentary trusts ranged from 
2had no presence whatsoever in Connecticut.9 The trustee, all trust assets applicable state 
trust law, and all trust administration were outside of Connecticut.10 Indeed, the essential 
“critical link” cited by the Supreme Court of Connecticut to justify Connecticut’s taxation 
of the New York inter vivos trustee’s income was that the trust’s sole, noncontingent 
beneficiary was a Connecticut resident.11 Connecticut’s sole contact with the 
testamentary trusts was the decedent settlor’s residence in Connecticut at the time of 
death, in one instance sixty-three years earlier.12 Such testamentary trusts, however, were 
formed under New York law with New York administration and New Trustee.13 In such 
circumstances, domicile of the decedent should not be controlling.14 
The Connecticut tax at issue was imposed upon the New York trustee’s entire 
accumulated, undistributed income and gains from the trust property.15 Connecticut’s 
authority to tax its own resident, i.e., the inter vivos trust’s Connecticut beneficiary, on 
the beneficiary’s income from any domestic or foreign source is unquestioned.16 This 
 
24 to 63 years old, having been formed many years previously under New York law by Connecticut 
decedents.  Id. at 786-87. 
9Id. at 787.  
10Id.  
11 Id. at 802.  
12 Id. at 787. 
13 See infra, Note 143, discussing District of Columbia v. Chase.
14 Id. Domicile should not be controlling, or even relevant. 
15 Gavin at 785, 802. 
16 See Schaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37(1920).  
3would clearly include distributed and even distributable income of a foreign trustee if 
Connecticut law had imposed such a tax on the resident beneficiary.17 
Gavin, however, held the New York trustee’s undistributed or undistributable 
income taxable. In doing so, the Connecticut Supreme Court failed to honor the 
admonitions of Quill that a taxpayer must initiate its own due process contacts with the 
taxing jurisdiction.18 The Gavin opinion also gave little attention to the Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause analysis19 which was essential to the Court’s rejection of North 
Dakota’s tax levy against Quill.  To the limited extent Gavin addressed the Connecticut 
tax’s discriminatory effect on interstate commerce, it misapplied Quill.20 The Connecticut 
justices also refused to follow a clear line of well-reasoned and authoritative cases21 that 
went clearly against their Gavin holding.22 
The opinion then played a shell game of words in order to artificially place its 
facts as to the inter vivos trust within those of a single, California case it cited as 
precedent,23 the facts, law, and holding of which were completely different.24 The 
 
17 McGuire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).  See discussion infra Part III A.  
18 See supra Notes 1-4 and accompanying text. Also, see infra, Parts V, VI, and VII.  
19 See discussion infra Part VII. 
20 See infra Note 211, et seq. and accompanying text.   
21See Nenno & Sparks, Delaware Dynasty Trust, at 32, published by Wilmington Trust, Wilmington 
Delaware:  “The court's constitutional analysis particularly for the inter vivos trust is unpersuasive.” 
22See infra Note 289. 
23McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 61 Cal. 2d 186, 37 Cal. Rptr. 636, 643 (1964), 390 P.2d 412 (Cal. 
1964), (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 379 US 133, 85 S. Ct. 278 (1964).   
 
24 See discussion infra Part VIII.  
4McCulloch case involved a unique California statute which was the predecessor of 
federal throwback rules.25 
The purpose of this article is to point out flaws in Gavin’s analysis and thereby 
hopefully lessen any inappropriate mischief to Constitutional principles that may result 
from its misguided holding.26 
The article first analyzes pre-Quill case law, and then discusses the Quill opinion.  
Thereafter, Gavin’s holding will be reviewed in light of this line of precedent cases, 
including its clearly misplaced reliance on McCulloch27, the only precedent it cited for 
taxation of the inter vivos trust. 
It is the recurring theme of this article that Constitutional due process analysis of 
state taxation of trusts has lost its way.  Courts must return to the fundamental principles 
of the law of trusts.  A “trust” is not “a legal person” or “an entity.”  In applying due 
process minimal contacts analysis, one must first determine what a “trust” is and what 
person’s contacts with the taxing state must be analyzed.  That is, in evaluating 
sufficiency of nexus for due process purposes, the law looks to the contacts of the 
“trustee” as a legal entity, not to contacts of a “trust”, an abstraction, or to a beneficiary? 
 
II. Synopsis of the Law of Trusts:  Inter Vivos v. Testamentary
A. A “trust” is not a legal person under state law.  
 
25 See infra Note 246 
26See Jordan M. Goodman, State Taxation of Business Trusts: Limits, Concerns and Opportunities, 9 Feb. 
J. Multistate Tax’n 6 (2000).  
27 See supra, Note 23. 
5The artificial nature of trusts complicates jurisdictional analysis.  A trustee is a 
legal person whether corporate or human.  The term “trust” means “a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person [trustee] by whom the title to 
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another 
person [beneficiary], which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create 
it.”28 Thus a trust is not a legal entity or person, but merely a “fiduciary relationship” 
whereby the trustee, a legal person, owns property subject to the duty to administer it on 
behalf of the beneficiary, a separate legal person.  The property and associated income 
subject to this fiduciary duty is the fiduciary’s, i.e., the trustee’s. Such property and 
affiliated income is not held by any separate, distinct legal entity referred to as “the 
trust,” and not by the beneficiary.29 A trust is a fiction, i.e. an abstraction.30 
As an “abstraction,” a trust may not sue or be sued or hold and transfer title to 
property in its own name.31 A trustee can sue or be sued based on the trustee’s actions or 
to determine issues pertaining to property held in such trustee’s name.32 The trustee need 
not sue in his name as trustee but solely in the trustee’s own name without reference to 
 
28 The Restatement, Second, Trusts, Section 2. [Emphasis added.]  I Scott, Trusts Section 2.3 (4th ed. 1987). 
Also see Randolph Foundation v. Appeal from Probate Court 2001 WL 418059 (2001), at 16 (trust is an 
abstraction). 
29 In the 1913 Revenue Act, Section II, Paragraph D, the fiduciary withheld tax for the beneficiary's tax 
liability.  Since 1916 taxes imposed on a "trust" are in reality fiduciary income taxes imposed on the 
fiduciary person in such person's capacity as fiduciary.  See e.g. 26 U.S.C. Section 641(b), and McCauley v. 
Comm., 44 F22 919(CCA5, 1930). 
30 See Randolph Foundation, supra, Note 28. 
31 See infra, Note 32. 
32 “The trustee can maintain such actions at law or suits in equity or other proceedings against a third 
person as he could maintain if he held the trust property free of trust.” Restatement, Second, Trusts, §280. 
6the trust relationship.33 Furthermore, a beneficiary is in no way an agent of the trustee 
nor a necessary or even proper party to an action by the trustee.34 A trust has no 
existence separate from the persons who hold differing interests therein.  Modern “entity 
law”35 generally recognizes the following legal persons: corporations, legal liability 
companies, general partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, 
REIT’S, and qualifying business trusts.36 
The law of trusts applies to both inter vivos trusts and testamentary trusts.  A trust 
may be created during the owner’s lifetime through transfer of property by deed to a 
trustee. For testamentary trusts, property is merely transferred from the decedent by will 
to a trustee. Transfer of property to a trustee by deed or by will merely reflects two 
different methods of creating a trust relationship.37 The method of transfer does not alter 
in any way requirements for creation of a trust relationship, e.g. settlor or testator’s 
capacity, intention to create a trust, designation of a beneficiary, duties to be performed 
by a trustee, etc.38 Each method requires an effective transfer of property to a trustee, 
irrespective of the instrument used to accomplish such a transfer, i.e. deed, assignment, or 
will. 
 
33 Id., subsection (h).  
34 Id., subsection (i). 
35 See Blumberg, The Corporate Entity In An Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEJCL 283,286.   
36 , Current Issues in Conveyance Practices, 15438 NBI-CLE 1, 7.   
37 ULA Trust Code Sec 401. "Methods of Creating Trust. A trust may be created by:  (1) transfer of 
property to another person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime or by will or other disposition taking effect 
upon the settlor's death."  Restatement, Second, Trusts Sec. 17. 
38 Id., Section 402 
7The law of the settlor’s or testator’s residence generally39 controls the 
effectiveness of the transferring instrument, whether that instrument is a deed or a will.40 
In the context of an inter vivos transfer, the transferor’s compliance with a state’s statute 
of frauds or formalities for real estate deeds allows the resident transferor to effectively 
transfer property to the trustee.41 In the context of a testamentary transfer, 
transferor/decedent’s compliance with a state’s statute of wills and probate formalities 
similarly allows the resident to effectively transfer property to the trustee by will at 
death.42 
These resident state laws directly apply to and benefit the state’s resident, whether 
inter vivos transferor or decedent.  These and other state laws of the transferor’s domicile 
indirectly benefit any transferee, resident or nonresident, on the other side of any such 
transfer or transaction.43 
Just as with an inter vivos trust, a testator may designate in his will which state 
law, other than the law of testator’s residence, to apply to governance of the trust.44 
Likewise, the testator may designate administration in a nondomiciliary state and may 
 
39 Except, for example, effective transfer of real estate is determined by the law of the situs state. 
40 See infra, Note 46.  
41 In the context of sales, compliance with the U.C.C. or a state's common law of contracts similarly 
enables a transferor to effectively transfer property. 
42 See infra, Note 46. 
43 See discussion of Quill infra, at Notes 185- 186, and accompanying text. 
44 ULA Trust Code Sec 107. "Governing Law. The meaning and effect of a trust are determined by:  (1) 
the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the designation of that jurisdiction's law is 
contrary to a strong public policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at 
issue; or . . ." [Emphasis added] 
8select a nonresident trustee.45 In contrast, the validity of the testator’s will as an effective 
dispository instrument is determined by the law of the testator’s state of residence.46 
Likewise, whether an instrument effectively conveys an interest in land is determined by 
the law of the situs of such land.47 
State law benefits afforded resident persons cannot, under due process, be 
attributed as an indirect benefit to every nonresident with whom such residents have 
personal or commercial relationships or dealings.48 If one state can impose tax burdens 
on the basis of such imputed state law benefits, every state, county, municipality or other 
taxing jurisdiction will have wholly unfettered ability to tax nationwide.  Such attribution, 
reattribution, or re-reattribution49 would create an infinite chain unwittingly and wrongly 
subjecting every person to the jurisdiction of every political subdivision in the nation. 
 
45 ULA Trust Code Sec 108.  Principal Place of Administration. (a) Without precluding other means for 
establishing a sufficient connection with the designated jurisdiction, terms of a trust designating the 
principal place of administration are valid and controlling if: (1) a trustee's principal place of business is 
located in or a trustee is a resident of the designated jurisdiction; or (2) all or part of the administration 
occurs in the designated jurisdiction.  [Emphasis added] 
46 Fratcher, William A., Scott on Trusts, 4th Edition, 1989. Sec. 649-650. Hanson v.  Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). 
47 Id. 
48 See infra, Note 218, et. seq., and accompanying text. 
49 In a recent, well-reasoned opinion, the Alabama Administrative Law Division (the "Division") rejected 
an attempt by the Alabama Department of Revenue ("ADOR") to impute such benefits under Alabama law.  
ADOR was attempting to impute activities of an Alabama limited partnership to its nonresident limited 
partner.  Lanzi, the limited partner, did not participate in management of the partnership or its assets, did 
not own property, earn income, or conduct business in Alabama, and resided in Georgia.49 The Division's 
opinion held that the limited partnership was treated as a separate legal entity under Alabama law.  The 
opinion then stated, "[b]ecause a partnership is a separate entity under current Alabama law, the presence 
and activities of a partnership in Alabama cannot be attributed to its nonresident [limited] partners for 
nexus purposes.  Separate legal entities must be recognized as such." Lanzi v. Alabama Department of 
Revenue, No. INC. 02721 (Ala. Admin. Law Div. Sept. 26, 2003).  This author acknowledges that he, along 
with Donald E. Johnson and David M. Wooldridge of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., represented Mr. Lanzi.  The 
case is presently on appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, the Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County having held that Alabama did have jurisdiction to tax the nonresident.   
 
9That is why Quill’s due process analysis requires that a nonresident knowingly and 
deliberately direct its contacts at the foreign jurisdiction.50 
B. What legal “person”51 must have “purposefully directed its activities”52 at a state 
in order to meet the minimum contacts standard for due process purposes?   
Sufficiency of contacts depends on the nature of the jurisdiction in question.  For 
an in rem action, contacts with the subject property must be determined.53 For in 
personam jurisdiction over a “person,” the contacts of such person must be determined.  
Analysis of jurisdiction to tax involves both in rem and in personam jurisdiction.  If a 
state has jurisdiction as to property, then it has jurisdiction to tax the income from such 
property.  That does not, however, equate to in personam jurisdiction over the owner of 
such property.54 
For example, a single member limited liability company (“LLC”) is a disregarded 
entity55 for income tax purposes.  However, under state laws it is a legal entity which can 
hold title to property, conduct business in its own name, and sue or be sued in its own 
 
50 See infra, Notes 185 - 186 and accompanying text; see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985) (taxpayer purposefully directed activities at the taxing state). 
51 The term "person" in this article may be an individual, i.e., a human person, or a legally recognized entity 
such as a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership. 
52 See infra, Note 185.   
53 Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, §292. 
54 Lowy and Vasquez, “When is it Unconstitutional for States to Tax Nonresident Members of Limited 
Liability Companies,” State Tax Notes, 633 (May 2003). (“The Power to Tax is empty without the power 
to collect the tax”. Jurisdiction to tax income is interdependent with personal jurisdiction over the 
taxpayer).  
55 See e.g. Chief Counsel Advisory, CCA 200216028.  
10
name.56 Thus income tax laws artificially render such an entity as nonexistent for income 
tax purposes.  For income tax purposes, the person who is the LLC’s single member is 
directly taxed.   
Assume such an LLC is formed under the laws of State X, actively conducts 
business in State X, and owns property in State X.  State X disregards the LLC for 
income tax purposes, thereby taxing Y, its single member.  If Y is a nonresident of State 
X, having no direct contact with State X, can State X tax nonresident Y based solely on 
Y’s ownership of the single member interest in the LLC?57 
Artificial, constantly evolving tax classifications and elections, should not and do 
not58 control the parameters of constitutional due process for tax or other jurisdictional 
purposes.  States have broad powers to impose income taxes subject only to constitutional 
limitations and their own states laws.59 For example, in the context of a trust, tax on 
income may and at times is imposed on the settlor/grantor, the trustee, and/or the 
beneficiary.  In the context of Gavin, Connecticut could tax the Connecticut resident 
settlor/grantor of a New York inter vivos trust. Taxation could be based on grantor trust 
rules60 or on deemed realization of gain upon transfer of the Connecticut property of such 
 
56 Id.; For a general discussion, See Bishop and Kleinberger, Limited Liability Companies: Tax and 
Business Law, 2000 WL 12016. 
57 What if this entity under "check the box" Treas. Reg. 301.7701, had elected to be taxed as a corporation?  
Should the vagaries of a tax election determine due process nexus?  What if the LLC elected to be taxed as 
a corporation, but then made a subchapter S election?  Should due process analysis change again? 
58 See supra, Note 49. Re: Lanzi; e.g. If Quill had been a subchapter S corporation, would its shareholder 
owners then have nexus with North Dakota, individually, i.e., would the corporation's contacts be attributed 
to its shareholders merely because of a tax election? 
59 In addition to due process and commerce clause restrictions, "realization" is a further constitutional 
constraint imposed on income taxation.  Glenshaw Glass, 349 U.S. 925 (1955). 
60 26 U.S.C §§ 671-679. 
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a resident to the out-of-state trustee.61 Subject to realization issues,62 Connecticut could 
have chosen to tax the Connecticut resident beneficiary on income earned from property 
or activities of the nonresident trustee, just as California had done.63 But, if Connecticut 
attempts to actually tax the nonresident trustee, the trustee itself must have knowingly 
directed its contacts at Connecticut.64 
III. Pre-Quill Cases
Predictably, there is a long line of state and federal cases addressing state 
jurisdiction to tax foreign trustees within the limits of federal due process.  Following is 
an analysis of some of these cases and a summary of the principles they establish. 
 
A. The earliest cases established three broad Constitutional principals.   
First, it was established in Bayfield County v. Pishon65 that a state could not tax a 
nonresident on income sourced outside such state.66 
61 See, e.g. 26 U.S.C. Sections 644 and 877, regarding tax on transfer of appreciated property.  Also, 
grantor trust rules should apply to all “foreign”, i.e. out of state trusts.  See e.g. 26 U.S.C. §679, and infra, 
Note 313.
62 A partner, S Corporation shareholder, grantor of a trust, or member of an LLC can be taxed on their 
allocable share of related income even though there has been no distribution and even in the absence of 
control over such distribution. 
63 See infra, Note 217, et. seq., and accompanying text.  In Lanzi, supra, Note 49, the Division 
acknowledged the power of ADOR to impose its tax through withholding imposed upon the Alabama 
Limited Partnership. 
64 Hanson v. Denckla, supra, Note 46, and Quill, infra, Note 180.   
 
65Bayfield County v. Pishon, 156 N.W. 463 (Wis. 1916). 
66 The issue was whether Wisconsin could impose a tax on a Wisconsin decedent’s testamentary trust’s 
income sourced outside Wisconsin. The trustee, trust property, and beneficiaries were outside Wisconsin. 
The court treated the trustee as a nonresident.  If a resident, source of income would have been irrelevant.  
12
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in Safe Deposit v. Virginia67 held that trust 
property has “a situs separate and apart from that” of trust beneficiaries.68 Safe Deposit is 
cited for the rule that “the taxing power of a state is restricted to her confines and may not 
be exercised in respect of subjects beyond them.”69 
Third, in Maguire v. Trefry70, the Supreme Court held that the state of a 
beneficiary’s residence could tax the beneficiary on distributions of current income71 
irrespective of its source.72 In Simmon73, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
 
The court held on the facts that trust administration within Wisconsin of the Wisconsin settlor’s 
testamentary trust did not result in the trust’s income having a Wisconsin source.  Id.   
67 In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, Md. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 
74 L. Ed. 180, Nov. 25, 1929.  The trustee was a resident of Maryland, and the beneficiaries were Virginia 
residents.  Virginia sought to impose an ad valorem tax on trust property based upon the beneficiaries' 
Virginia residency. 
68 Another early case, Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Simmon, 198 N.E. 741, (1935), is 
discussed infra, Note 73.  Simmons held a resident of Massachusetts nontaxable on distribution of 
accumulated income from a nonresident trustee (state income held to have become nontaxable trust 
principal under Mass. statutes). 
69 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938).  The Court's reasoning on the risk of double 
taxation in Safe Deposit would probably not be followed today.  Fogel, infra, Note 114, at 180-182.  
Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386, 395-96 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983). 
70 Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld and the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed a Massachusetts tax on the Massachusetts resident beneficiary’s income 
received from the nonresident trust. 
71 Id., at 13-14. The case involved current income distributed to the beneficiary, not accumulated income as 
in Simmon, McCulloch, and Gavin, Notes 73, 23, and 6, respectively.   
72 The plaintiff beneficiary was a Massachusetts resident.  The trust was a testamentary trust of a 
Pennsylvania resident being administered under Pennsylvania law and the income producing property was 
in Pennsylvania. Id. 
73 198 N.E. 741 (1935). See Ferrell, State Taxation of Income Accumulated in Trusts, 51 ABAJ 566 (June 
1965).  
13
ruled, however, that Massachusetts could not tax a Massachusetts resident beneficiary 
upon previously accumulated trust income when later distributed by a foreign trustee.74 
In 1935, both federal and Massachusetts statutes only taxed a trust beneficiary 
when “income,”75 as defined by trust accounting rules, was distributed.  The definition of 
“income” included only current year income.  Previously accumulated income was 
treated as having become inextricably commingled with principal.76 Thus, the foreign 
trustee’s distribution of accumulated income was treated as a distribution of principal by 
Massachusetts tax statutes.77 A beneficiary’s receipt of principle from an estate or trust is 
viewed as a gift, bequest, or return of capital.  Nevertheless, receipt of a gift or bequest 
could itself constitute “income” for tax purposes.  
Income has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as an “undeniable accession 
to wealth clearly realized and over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.”78 
Therefore, there is no Constitutional barrier to taxation of the receipt of property whether 
state law treats it as “income” or “principal.”  However, federal and Massachusetts tax 
statutes exclude gifts and inheritances from taxable income.79 Thus, Massachusetts could 
 
74 “Foreign” meaning the trust had a nonresident settlor, a nonresident trustee, trust property was outside 
Massachusetts, and both trust law and trust administration were outside Massachusetts.
75 Federal D.N.I rules did not come into existence until the 1940’s and 1950’s. See Blackburn, Unique 
Alabama Trust and Estate Income Tax Rules Create Traps for Alabama Lawyers. 60 Al Law 249 (July, 
1999). 
76 See infra, Note 250 
77 The opinion cited MGLA 62 §§1 and 10. 
78 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348. U.S. 426, 75 S. Ct. 473 (1935).    
79 See, e.g. 26 U.S.C. §102. 
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constitutionally have taxed the Massachusetts beneficiary on the distribution, but 
statutorily had not taxed it.80 
The Simmon opinion was rendered shortly before Professor Roger John Traynor 
wrote his classic article on taxation of trusts, settlors, and beneficiaries.81 Thereafter, as 
recommended by Professor Traynor, deficiencies in California principal and income 
statutes were remedied so as to enable California to later tax its resident beneficiaries 
upon actual distribution of previously accumulated trust income.82 
Thus, for the better part of a century it has been clear that a state can tax its 
residents on all income irrespective of source.  The issue in Simmon was the state’s own 
principle and income statutes which prevented taxation of residents on receipt of 
accumulated trust income, treating it as a nontaxable principal distribution.  Nonresidents 
can only be taxed on income sourced within the taxing jurisdiction. 
B. Later cases more sharply defined the issues.   
In Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy,83 a New York resident created 
an inter vivos trust governed under Maryland law with a Maryland trustee and a New 
 
80 A revision of Massachusetts’s principal income statutes to redefine income or elimination of the income 
tax exclusion for gifts and inheritance taxes would have empowered the state to tax its own resident.    
81 Infra, Note; Traynor referenced Simmon, infra, Note 28.  
82 See infra, Note 277 and Note 246 and accompanying text. See Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §17745(c) “… 
income accumulated by a trust continues to be income even thought the trust provides that the income 
(ordinary or capital) shall become a part of the corpus.” 
83 Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 203 N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. 1964). 
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York beneficiary.84 After Grantor’s death85, New York undertook to directly tax the 
Maryland trustee on accumulated trust income.86 
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment in 
favor of the trustee and against levy of the New York tax.  The court reasoned that the 
inability of New York to tax the Maryland trustee was not due to the risk of double 
taxation.  Rather, it was due to “the inability of a State to levy taxes beyond its border.”87 
This case makes clear the rule that a state lacks the power to tax a trustee when 
the state lacked in personam jurisdiction over the trustee and lacked in rem jurisdiction 
over the trust property.  There was no other contact with such state and the mere 
residency of the beneficiary and settlor were not deemed to be contacts of the nonresident 
trustee.88 
The court cites Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Co. for the proposition that: 
“the imposition of a tax in the State in which the 
beneficiaries of a trust reside, on securities in the 
possession of the trustee in another State, to the control or 
possession of which the beneficiaries have no present right, 
is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 89 
84 Id. at 490.  But, c.f. infra, Note 122 and accompanying text (discussing District of Columbia v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997). 
85 The Grantor’s wife, a New York resident, succeeded him as income beneficiary, but income distributions 
by the Maryland trustee to the wife were merely discretionary.  The Trustee was domiciled in Maryland, 
where the trust, being a non-testamentary, inter vivos trust, was administered, and the assets were in the 
trustee’s possession.  When the grantor died, his will was probated in New York.  Mercantile-Safe Deposit 
& Trust Co., 203 N.E. 2d. at 490. 
86 Id. at 491  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 203 N.E.2d at 490. 
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At this point in the historical review, it is clear that residence of the settlor and/or 
beneficiary in a state does not cause such state to have either in rem or in personam 
jurisdiction over trust property or the trustee. Indeed, residence of the settlor and/or the 
beneficiary is wholly irrelevant in establishing jurisdiction90 as to the nonresident trustee 
or trust property.91 
In Pennoyer v. Taxation Division Director,92 a New Jersey domiciliary’s will 
created a testamentary trust.93 The trustee designated by the will was a resident of New 
York, assets were maintained in New York94, and the beneficiaries were not residents of 
New Jersey.95 Taxes were assessed against the trustee by New Jersey. The New Jersey 
Tax Director claimed the availability of New Jersey courts and the creation of the trust 
relationship through probate96 of decedent’s will in New Jersey were sufficient to uphold 
the tax.97 
90 Reference to in personam jurisdiction over the trustee is only as to matters pertaining to the particular 
trust relationship at issue.  See infra, discussion of Shaffer at Note 221, et seq. and accompanying text.  
91 Residence of the settlor is only relevant if, due to default in planning, law of the state of residence 
governs the trust. Infra, Note 104.
92 Pennoyer v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax 386 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983).  
93 Id. at 390. 
94 Id. at 391. 
95 Id. at 390-91. Also, see supra, Note 45. 
96 Probate merely affected the transfer of testator's property to the trustee.  Creation and governance of the 
trust occurs under laws designated in the instrument itself, i.e. New York, not New Jersey.  See supra, Note 
44. 
97 Id. at 392. 
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The opinion98 discussed several state court cases that had addressed the 
question.99 The court stated that the protection and control a state exercises over property 
could give a state the right to tax the income of that property.100 Ultimately, the court 
held, “[t]he creation of the trust in 1971 through the probate process in New Jersey courts 
is an [sic] historical fact which, absent continuing contacts, is not a constitutional nexus 
justifying income taxation of undistributed income earned in 1979-80.”101 
Based on Pennoyer, 102 a state cannot tax a trustee based solely on historical 
contacts technically established through transfer of property by a resident to a 
nonresident.103 The trust must actually be created and administered under New Jersey 
law and must continue to receive significant benefits under New Jersey law.   Compare 
this holding with District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, which upheld in 
personam jurisdiction over the trustee when the resident decedent’s will did not designate
98 The court’s opinion noted that the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of taxability 
of a trust on undistributed trust income.  Id. at 393.  But see supra, Note 89. 
99Id. at 393.  The court discusses Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); Safe-Deposit & Trust 
Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Bayfield County v. Pishon, 156 N.W. 463 (Wis. 1916); and Taylor v. 
State Tax Comm’n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
100 In rem jurisdiction. However, trust property was held in New York by the New York trustees. Pennoyer,
5 N.J. Tax at 397. 
101 Lack of in personam jurisdiction over the trustee.  Id. at 397 - 398.  “Since the trust in not administered 
in New Jersey and the trustee, trust assets and beneficiaries are not located in New Jersey, the only contact 
between this trust and New Jersey is the fact that the grantor was domiciled here, letters were issued here, 
the trustee is amenable to service of process here, and the courts are available to resolve disputes relating to 
the trust.” [Emphasis added.] 
102 Supra, Note 92. 
103 Again, a state's statute of wills merely controls effectiveness of the transfer of a decedent/resident's 
property into the trust.  If the will designates a foreign trustee, foreign administration, and foreign 
applicable law, such foreign law establishes and controls the fiduciary relationship.  See supra, Note 44. If 
New Jersey law provided for a lifetime transfer of a resident’s personal property to an out of state 
transferee, such transferee, whether a trustee or otherwise, does not become subject to in personam 
jurisdiction in New Jersey, nor does New Jersey have in rem jurisdiction because of the transfer.   
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foreign applicable law or foreign administration.  D.C. law and D.C. administration 
applied to the nonresident trustee’s trust relationship in the absence of such a 
designation.104 
Thus, in Mercantile, Pennoyer, and Potter,105 state courts in New York and New 
Jersey had ruled that domicile of a trust’s settlor, standing alone, was an insufficient basis 
for a state to have in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee or in rem 
jurisdiction over all trust assets.  In Mercantile, the added presence of the trust’s sole 
beneficiary failed to establish in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee when 
trust property,106 applicable trust law, and trust administration were all elsewhere.  It was 
clear from this line of cases that domicile of the settlor and of the beneficiary was not 
sufficiently related to production of trust income or to contacts of the trustee to permit 
taxation of the nonresident trustee and property.  In Pennoyer, it was held that mere 
probation of a resident’s will did not create in personam or in rem jurisdiction in 
decedent’s state of residence.     
 
104 Infra, Note 147,  et. seq. and accompanying text.  In Potter v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax 
399 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983), a New Jersey resident created an inter vivos trust.  The trust instrument designated 
New York law to govern trust administration.  All trust assets and trustees were located outside New 
Jersey.  The trust was designed as a “pour-over” trust, which would receive assets as a beneficiary under 
the settlor’s will.  Although New Jersey law applied to effectiveness of the will's transfer of property to the 
trust, New York law applied to the trust relationship itself.  Following the settlor’s death, New Jersey 
claimed it had sufficient contacts to impose a tax on the New York trustee based on the fact that the settlor 
was domiciled in New Jersey at the time of the trust’s creation and at the time of the settlor’s death. The 
court held that the contacts between New Jersey and the inter vivos trust were even less than those argued 
in Pennoyer. Indeed, the existing pour-over trust, previously established as an inter vivos trust and not as a 
testamentary trust funded through New Jersey probate, was no different than any other beneficiary under 
decedent’s will.  The Potter court relied on the reasoning of Pennoyer in disallowing the tax.  Again, this 
opinion is distinguished from District of Columbia v Chase (See infra, Note 143) in which resident state 
law applied to the trust. The distinction between inter vivos and testamentary trusts should be irrelevant.  
105 See supra, Notes 89, 92, and 104. 
106 Presence of trust property should only be relevant as to in rem jurisdiction over such property and 
income therefrom.  Location of property is irrelevant in establishing in personam jurisdiction over its 
owner, whether the owner is considered to be the trustee or the “trust” as an abstract relationship.                 
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In, Swift v. Director of Revenue,107 Missouri courts considered what more was 
required than settlor/decedent’s domicile.  Missouri sought to impose a tax on 
testamentary trusts created by will of a Missouri resident.  The trustees, trust property, 
beneficiaries, and the trust administration were all outside Missouri. 
The court held that the trusts108were not afforded any protection or benefit under 
Missouri law that constituted sufficient nexus to uphold the tax.  The tax levy failed the 
Due Process test of the Fourteenth Amendment.109 The Swift court’s holding follows the 
holdings in Mercantile, Pennoyer, Potter, and Taylor.110 However, the opinion then 
suggested “relevant” factors to be used to guide the decision-making process in the 
future. The court considered the following six factors to be relevant in determining 
whether a sufficient nexus existed to support general in personam jurisdiction over the 
trustee as a Missouri resident111:
(1)  [T]he domicile of the settlor, (2) the state in which the trust is created, 
i.e. applicable state law, (3) the location of trust property, (4) the domicile 
of the beneficiaries, (5) the domicile of the trustees, and (6) the location of 
the administration of the trust. For purposes of supporting an income tax, 
the first two of these factors require the ongoing protection or benefit of 
state law only to the extent that one or more of the other four factors is 
present.112 
107 Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). 
108 Again, the issue should be whether the nonresident trustee knowingly directed its activities at Missouri, 
e.g. knowingly became trustee of a trust relationship established and administered under Missouri law.  
109 Id. 
110 Respectively, supra Notes 83 through 106, and infra Note 204. 
111 Residency solely as to the trust relationship at issue.  Even as a nonresident, the trustee would be taxed 
on income from property in Missouri as Missouri source income.  
112Id. at 882. 
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However, it is the thesis of this article that some of these factors are relevant and some 
are not. Contact number 3, the location of trust property, applies only to the questions of 
in rem jurisdiction on a property by property analysis. Contact number 2 (law governing 
trust creation and operation), 5 (domicile of trustee), and 6 (location of trust 
administration) are the only factors relevant to the issue of in personam jurisdiction over 
the trustee.  Contacts 1 (settlor domicile) and 2 (beneficiary domicile) are only relevant as 
to a state’s taxation of the settlor or the beneficiary.113 
The Swift rationale and pronouncement of relevant factors to provide guidelines 
for the essential “more” for in personam jurisdiction has become widely 
accepted.114Nevertheless, this article suggests that its listed factors should not have 
included residence of the settlor or the beneficiary. 
The issue in Westfall v. Director of Revenue115 was whether a tax may be imposed 
on all of a resident trust’s income when only part of the income was produced from 
property actually located in the state.116 The settlor was domiciled in Missouri at the time 
of his death, his will was admitted to probate in Missouri,117 and the trust was subject to 
 
113 See supra, Note 98.  
114 Bradley E.S. Fogel, What Have You Done For Me Lately, 32 URMDLR 165, at 206 M. Read Moore, 
Amy L. Silliman, State Income Taxation of Trust:  New Case Creates Uncertainty, 24 Est. Pln. 200 (June, 
1997). 
115 Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 804 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 
1991). 
116 Id. at 28.  Also see infra Taylor, Note 204.  
117 Wills are always admitted to probate in the state of decedent's domicile.  Again, probate merely effects 
the transfer of property into the trust, but, if the decedent so directs, the trust can be created under the laws 
of a different state.  Probate does not equate to trust creation.  A trust is created under applicable laws 
designated by its Settlor and in the absence of designation, domicile state laws apply. 
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Missouri law and administration.118 No income was distributed to Missouri residents, no 
trustees were residents of Missouri, and no legal proceedings took place in Missouri on 
behalf of the trustee or the beneficiaries.119 
Under the Missouri statute, the entire income of the trustee could be taxed, and 
credits were available to resident trustees for taxes paid to other states.120 No credit was 
given, however, because the trustee did not pay tax to any other state.121 The court looked 
to the six factors stated in Swift to determine the validity of the tax.122 The trustee tried to 
distinguish Swift, but the court, based on Missouri contacts, held the tax valid.123 Westfall 
is consistent with and follows Mercantile, Pennoyer, Potter, Taylor and Swift. 
Again, this article’s thesis is in full accord with the result, but not the full 
rationale, of Swift124. Location of property in a state clearly establishes in rem 
jurisdiction over the income derived from such property.  Location of property has little 
or nothing to do with in personam jurisdiction over the trustee, however.  As in Chase125,
the trust relationship, by default, was created under Missouri law and administered in 
 
118 Id. Note that the last two factors could have been changed if the trust instrument had designated 
applicable law of a different state and a different location for trust administration.  See infra, Note 143 re 
Chase. 
119 Id. at 28-29. 
120 Id. at 29.  The tax credit would have avoided double taxation and resulted in proper allocation of the tax 
burden, as required by the Commerce Clause.  See infra, Note 195.  
121 Id.
122Id. at 29-30.  See Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).  Swift is 
discussed supra at Notes 96 through 101 and accompanying text. 
123 Westfall, 804 S.W.2d at 30. 
124 Supra, Note 96. 
125 Infra, Note 147. 
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Missouri.  Therefore, the trustee knowingly accepted its obligations under and subject to 
Missouri law.  
In Blue v. Department of Treasury126, a Michigan resident created a revocable 
inter vivos trust.127 The trustee was a Florida resident, the trust was formed and 
administered under Florida law, and the trust assets were located in Florida, except for 
one piece of real estate, which was located in Michigan.128 The Michigan real estate did 
not produce income.  The income beneficiary was a Florida resident.  Since the settlor 
was a resident of Michigan, Michigan’s “founder” trustee rules treated the trust as a 
Michigan resident based solely on domicile of the settlor.  Michigan assessed taxes on 
income from trust property accumulated by the trust between 1982 and 1987.   
The trial court held the tax invalid under the Due Process Clause.129 On appeal, 
the Michigan Department of Treasury claimed that sufficient nexus existed to support 
taxation because the trust received the protection and benefits of Michigan laws.130 The 
Michigan Court of Appeals, in disallowing the tax, stated:  
The state cannot create hypothetical legal protections through a 
classification scheme whose validity is constitutionally suspect and 
attempt to support the constitutionality of the statute by these hypothetical 
legal protections.  We analogize the present case to a hypothetical statute 
authorizing that any person born in Michigan to resident parents is deemed 
a resident and taxable as such, no matter where they reside or earn their 
 
126 Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
127 Id. at 763. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 764.  Note that the Settlor received the benefits of Michigan law, but not the trustee.   
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income.  We believe this would be clearly outside of the state’s power to 
impose taxes.131 
The court followed Swift and Mercantile-Safe Deposit in holding the tax invalid under the 
Due Process Clause.132 
Blue clearly supports the thesis of this article.  The Michigan property was clearly 
subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the State of Michigan.  The property produced no 
income, however, and its presence established no basis whatsoever for in personam 
jurisdiction over the Florida trustee.  The trust relationship, knowingly accepted by the 
Florida trustee, was created and administered under Florida law.133 
IV. Summary of Pre-Quill Precedent
Certain broad pre-Quill principles were clear. States could tax their own residents 
on their worldwide income.134 Just as clearly, states could not impose taxes, i.e. lacked in 
rem or general in personam jurisdiction on income or persons beyond their borders, but 
could tax income sourced from property within the taxing state.  However, as usual, the 
devil is in the details.  
 
131 Id. at 764-65. [Emphasis added]  The suspect classification scheme was the treatment of a "Founder 
Trust", i.e., a trust created by a Michigan resident, as a "resident trust" taxable in Michigan on it is 
worldwide income.  The same scheme was present in New York law (See supra, Note 83) and was also 
held unconstitutional. 
132 Id. at 764. 
133 One author argues that Blue and Westfall are “inconsistent” because Blue, too, technically meets the first 
three Swift factors.  The  major distinction that can be made of Blue is that the Michigan property of the 
trust was non-income producing.  The Blue court was fair in its decision and justified in using the strong 
language quoted, supra, to admonish states for finding “hypothetical legal protections” and 
“constitutionally suspect” classifications for imposing a tax. Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 762. 
134 See supra, Note 70; also Cook v. Tait, at 265 U.S. 47, 55 (1924) (stating, “the native citizen who is taxed 
may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country 
and the tax be legal-- the government having power to impose the tax”). 
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In Mercantile, Blue, Pennoyer and Potter,135 New York, Missouri, and New 
Jersey all held that mere residency of a settlor, i.e., a Founder Trust, was an insufficient 
basis for a state to impose general in personam jurisdiction over and tax a nonresident, 
inter vivos trustee.136 In Mercantile, the residency of the income beneficiary in New 
York, in addition to the Settlor’s residency failed to uphold New York’s attempt to tax 
the out-of-state trustee on undistributed trust income held for the benefit of New York 
residents.137 
The rulings in Pennoyer, Mercantile, Swift, Blue, Westfall, Taylor and Potter are 
well-established and well-reasoned.  First, they appropriately reflect the legal distinction 
between the trustee and the settlor and/or beneficiaries as separate legal persons.  
Standing alone, residence of the settlor was clearly found to provide insufficient nexus 
for taxation of a nonresident trustee.138 
The state of the settlor’s domicile could, under various theories, tax the resident 
settlor on trust income.  Grantor trust rules139 are a clear example of income tax theories 
under which a resident settlor can be taxed on a foreign trust’s accumulated income.  But 
 
135 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999), refused to follow these cases. 
136 The nexus was insufficient to treat the inter vivos trustee as a “resident.”  As a nonresident, the trustee 
could still be taxed on income sourced within the state or as the result of the trustee being subject to general 
in personam jurisdiction. 
137 Distributed income could, of course, have been taxed by New York to its resident income beneficiary.  
Even income initially accumulated within the trust could have been taxed by New York to its resident 
beneficiary when ultimately distributed.  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 414-15 
(Cal. 1964). 
138 See Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, Interstate Style:  First Notes on a Theme from Saenz, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133 (2002), for a critical scholarly analysis of “Founder-State Trusts.” 
139 I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (West 2002).  In particular, see § 679, which applies grantor trust rules to foreign 
(non-U.S.) trusts with U.S. beneficiaries. 
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residence of the settlor will not provide nexus to allow taxation of a nonresident trustee or 
claim the trustee is a resident of the taxing state.  
Likewise, domicile of a trust’s beneficiary clearly establishes a state’s nexus to 
tax the beneficiary but provides no basis whatsoever for taxation of the legally distinct 
trustee.  Beneficiaries can, of course, be taxed upon distributed income or even on 
accumulated trust income when distributed at a future date.140 Taxation of the 
beneficiary on accumulated trust income before ultimate distribution would be more an 
issue of realization than of nexus.141 
Mere domicile of the settlor and/or the beneficiary should provide no nexus for 
treating the trustee as a resident or subject to in personam jurisdiction as to the trust 
relationship.  Obviously, the trustee is a legal person separate and distinct from the settlor 
and/or beneficiary.  The trustee must have created nexus through its own contacts 
directed at the taxing state.142 A resident settlor’s establishment of a foreign inter vivos 
trust, i.e., applicable foreign law, foreign administration, and foreign trustee, provides no 
nexus between the foreign trustee and settlor’s state of residence.143 Establishment of a 
similar foreign144 testamentary trust also provides no nexus with the foreign trustee. 
 
140 See discussion of Simmon, supra Note 73, and accompanying text.  See also, discussion of McCulloch v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1964), infra Part IX and federal throwback rules, discussed infra, 
Note 246 
141 See infra, Note 78 and accompanying text. 
142 The fiduciary must itself have directed relevant activities at the taxing state as required by Quill. See 
infra, 160 and 185. 
143 In D.C. v Chase, infra Note 147, D.C. law and D.C. administration were, by default, applicable law to 
the trust, even though trustee, trust assets and beneficiaries were outside of D.C. 
144 The term “Foreign” meaning applicable foreign law, foreign administration, and a foreign trustee.   
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Relevant factors affecting in personam jurisdiction over the trustee as to the trust 
relationship include only: (1) the trust relationship is governed by state law145; (2) a 
trustee lives in the state; or (3) the trust is administered in the state.146 Situs of property 
is only relevant as to in rem jurisdiction and is not relevant to establish in personam 
jurisdiction over the trustee.  Residency of the settlor or beneficiary is not relevant 
factors. 
In District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,147 a post-Quill case, a D.C. tax 
on a foreign trustee was upheld. The trust relationship was established by the will of a 
resident of D.C., subject to D.C. law, and administered in D.C.148 The opinion noted that 
a trust “created” under D.C. law and with D.C. administration, much like a domestic 
corporation, was a creature of the law of its state of organization.149 
145 In Swift, this factor is confusingly described as “the state in which the trust is created.”  This 
terminology confuses the issue of probate and compliance with a state’s statute of wills [wholly irrelevant 
factors] on one hand, and the law which governs establishment and operation of the trust relationship on the 
other.   
146 IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 35.1.1.35 (2003).  See Income Taxation of Trust Income:  Idaho Law, Practical 
Drafting 6618-6619 (October, 2001). 
147 District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997). 
148 Professor Roger John Traynor had predicted taxation of testamentary trusts on this basis many years ago 
in his classic article on trust taxation.  See Roger John Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOWA L. 
REV. 268 (1937) (discussed infra Part VIII). 
149 Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 544.  The will did not designate foreign applicable law or foreign 
administration, so, by default, D.C. law applied. See supra, Note 44. The opinion refused to extend its 
holding to an inter vivos trust established by a D.C. resident as follows:   
We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of taxing the entire net income of inter vivos trusts based 
solely on the fact that the settlor was domiciled in the District when she died and the trust therefore became 
irrevocable.  In such cases, the nexus between the trust and the District is arguably more attenuated, since 
the trust was not created by probate of the decedent's will in the District's courts. An irrevocable inter vivos
trust does not owe its existence to the laws and courts of the District in the same way that the testamentary 
trust at issue in the present case does, and thus it does not have the same permanent tie to the District.  In 
some cases the District courts may not even have principle supervisory authority over such an inter vivos 
trust.  The idea of fundamental fairness, which under girds our due process analysis, therefore may or may 
not compel a different result in an inter vivos trust context.  (Emphasis added). Everything the court stated 
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The Chase opinion’s finding of sufficient nexus was based on the specific facts of 
that case.  Despite dictum150, nexus was not based on mere residency of the decedent in 
the District.  Neither was nexus founded on mere probate of decedent’s will in the 
District.  Nexus was based on the trust relationship being administered in the District 
under District laws.  Decedent had not designated administration or laws of another 
jurisdiction.  The foreign trustee accepted its duties subject to such conditions.  
Other than the unprecedented holding in Gavin, none of these cases found due 
process nexus based solely on the residence of the settlor and/or beneficiary in the taxing 
state. 
V. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota151 
Quill Corporation conducted a mail order business throughout the United States.  
Although Quill was not a resident of North Dakota and had no physical presence in the 
state, i.e., no warehouse, office, etc., it did make catalogue sales of products into North 
Dakota.152 The United States Supreme Court addressed the validity of the North Dakota 
use tax on a nonresident under both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of 
the U. S. Constitution.153 
as to an inter vivos trust is equally applicable to a testamentary trust when the will designates foreign law 
and foreign administration. 
Id. at 547 n.11.  Again, in the "present case" the will failed to invoke foreign law or foreign administration. 
150 Id.
151 See supra, Note 1. 
152Id. at 302. 
153 Id. at 305. 
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In addressing North Dakota’s ability to tax Quill’s North Dakota activities154 
within due process limits, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause required: (1) 
“some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and a person, property or 
transaction it seeks to tax,”155 and (2) “that the income attributed to the State for tax 
purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State.”156 The 
North Dakota tax being levied in this case was a use tax.  Relying on International Shoe 
Company v. Washington157 and its progeny, the Court stated, “we have framed the 
relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction ‘such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”158 
The Court continued its analysis and held that due process could be satisfied even 
if a taxpayer had no physical presence within the taxing state.159 Regarding the 
imposition of a sales/use tax, the Court held that such reasoning “justifies the imposition 
of the collection duty on a mail order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread 
solicitation of business within a state.  Such a corporation clearly has ‘fair warning that 
 
154 North Dakota never attempted to tax Quill as a “resident.” 
155 Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v Md., 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)). 
156 Id. (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978)).  Quill was clearly being taxed as a 
nonresident.  The North Dakota tax would only be imposed on Quill's North Dakota sales.  Quill would not 
be subject as a resident taxpayer to general taxation by North Dakota on all its sales. Id. at 303. 
157 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
158 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted). 
159 Id. at 308. 
29
[its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’”160 Thus, North 
Dakota’s sales/use tax levy was held to satisfy the Court’s due process standard.  
Analysis of the negative sweep of the Commerce Clause, i.e., those aspects of 
state activity prohibited because they may unduly interfere with interstate commerce, 
ultimately led to a determination that the sales/use tax could not be imposed by North 
Dakota.  The Court analyzed the negative impact of state taxation on interstate 
commerce.  The Court then noted that it had “adopted a ‘multiple-taxation doctrine’ that 
focused not on whether a tax was ‘direct’ or ‘indirect,’ but rather on whether a tax 
subjected interstate commerce to “a risk of multiple taxation.”161 
The Court ultimately held that it would apply the four-part test which it first 
established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady162 to the Commerce Clause 
question.163 The Court stated that “under Complete Auto’s four-part test we will sustain a 
tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity 
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided 
by the State.’”164 
Again, this test was being applied to the allocable, i.e. North Dakota source, sales 
of a nonresident.  Neither Complete Auto nor Quill dealt with classification and taxation 
 
160 Id. (alterations in original), quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) discussed infra at Note 
218, et seq. and accompanying text. 
161Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
162 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
163 Quill, 504 U.S. at 310. 
164 Id. at 311 (citation omitted) [emphasis added.]. 
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of a resident on its worldwide income.  Even if state law denominates or classifies a trust 
as being a “resident trust”, imposition of a tax on the trustee must not violate due process 
or the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.165 
At least in the context of sales/use taxes and the mail order business, the Court 
reaffirmed the continued applicability of the bright line presence test set forth in National 
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue166 as applied to factor [1] of Complete Auto‘s 
four-part Commerce Clause test.167 The Court was also emphatic that the due process 
“minimum contacts” test required much less than the “substantial nexus” test of the 
Commerce Clause, stating, “[a] tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly 
burden interstate commerce.”168 The Court held that the first and fourth prongs of the 
Complete Auto test “require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the tax and 
state-provided services,” to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate 
commerce.169 
VI. Are State Benefits Afforded a Beneficiary Attributable to a Nonresident Trustee for 
Due Process Purposes?
A. Gavin 
165 See supra, Note 135 and Blue re "constitutionally suspect classifications". 
166 Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
167 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317 (stating, “the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine 
and principles of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law”).  The Bellas Hess test 
remains good, at least as applied to state sales and use taxes and the mail order business, but the Supreme 
Court also stated that “the bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.”  Id. at 314. 
168Id. at 313 n.7. 
169 The [p]urpose of the Commerce Clause is to insure a national economy free from unjustifiable local 
entanglement. . ." National Bellas Hess, supra, Note 166.  Realize that the first and fourth prongs of this 
test address the same two issues as due process analysis, i.e. (1) sufficiency of nexus, and (2) relationship 
between state tax and state benefits provided.  See supra, Note 156.
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The facts of Gavin were summarized in the Introduction to this article.  
Connecticut taxed a New York trustee based on claimed in personam jurisdiction as to 
the trust relationship.  The trustee had no Connecticut contacts, trust property was in New 
York, trust administration was in New York, and New York law governed the creation 
and enforcement of the trust relationship.170 
The Gavin opinion justified its taxation of the foreign trustee of the single inter 
vivos trust by citing benefits Connecticut law provided to the trust’s Connecticut 
beneficiary.171 Based on this analysis, Connecticut would tax, and claim compliance with 
due process, any estate or trust, whether testamentary or inter vivos,172 established by 
even a nonresident settlor, if such estate or trust had a Connecticut beneficiary.173 The 
following benefits to the Gavin beneficiary cited by the opinion would apply equally to a 
Connecticut beneficiary of any nonresident estate or trust, whether or not established by a 
Connecticut settlor: 
In the present case, the critical link to the undistributed income sought to 
be taxed is the fact that the non-contingent beneficiary of the inter vivos 
trust during the tax year in question was a Connecticut domiciliary. The 
accumulated income eventually will be paid . . . to her . . . [or] to her then 
living descendants.  Thus . . . she enjoyed all the protections and benefits 
afforded to other domiciliaries.  Her right to the eventual receipt and 
enjoyment of the accumulated income was . . . protected by the laws of the 
 
170 See supra, Note 9 
171 Id. at 803. Minimum contacts were deemed satisfied by “the presence in the state of a noncontingent 
beneficiary who receives the benefits and protections of the state's laws.”  
172 Regarding inter vivos trusts, the Gavin court stated “[a]lthough this is a closer case than that with respect 
to the testamentary trusts, we conclude that the state's taxation scheme of the undistributed income of the 
inter vivos trust satisfies the due process clause.” 
173 Although the settlor in Gavin was a Connecticut resident when the inter vivos trust was established, that 
was not, and could not have been, the basis for finding minimum contacts for due process purposes.  See 
infra, Note 174. 
32
state.  We conclude that . . . a state may . . . tax the income of an inter 
vivos trust that is accumulated for the ultimate benefit of a non-contingent 
domiciliary...174 
Connecticut law benefited its resident beneficiary.  If the beneficiary’s noncontingent 
status satisfied the “realization” requirement for “income,” Connecticut could clearly tax 
its beneficiary.175 The Gavin opinion, however, improperly attributed such benefits to the 
New York trustee for purposes of due process.  Again, the New York trustee had no 
contacts with Connecticut and derived no benefits from Connecticut law.176 Once this 
attribution from beneficiary to trustee is allowed to occur, there is the potential for 
endless reattribution of state law benefits, i.e., why stop with mere single attribution?  
This rationale would and did turn due process on its head in the context of Gavin: "Where 
there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property, the imposition of a tax would be 
ultra vires and void." 177 
Could shareholder domicile states tax nonresident corporations that have no 
business or other contact with such state, or vice versa, as a result of attribution of state 
law benefits from a resident shareholder to such corporation?  We know the answer to 
this rhetorical question—it is clearly No!178 
174 Id. at 802 (emphasis added). See discussion infra, Note 218.
175 See discussion of Simmon and Glenshaw Glass, supra, Note 73.  
176 See supra, Notes 9 - 13 and accompanying text.  
177 Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341 citing City of St. Louis v. Wiggins Family Co., 
II Wall. 42S430. 
178 See infra, Note 180.  
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In Canon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co,179 the Supreme Court first 
held that corporate contacts cannot be attributed to shareholders of the corporation and 
vice versa.180 This principle has clearly been extended to a limited partnership and 
attribution of its contacts to limited partners.181 If general partners are agents acting on 
behalf of their partnership, contacts of the general partner can be attributed to the 
partnership.  This is solely because the partner’s actions as agent are actions of the 
partnership.182 However, beneficiaries, as such, are not agents of the trustee.  Clearly, the 
beneficiary and the trustee are distinct legal persons.183 
In Quill, the Supreme Court looked to the Taxpayer’s direct contacts with, and 
benefits derived from, North Dakota.  Indirect benefits of North Dakota law to Quill’s 
North Dakota customers or vendors which might be attributed to Quill were not even 
analyzed by the Court184. To establish “minimum contacts” for due process, the Supreme 
Court noted that “Quill” itself had mailed 24 tons of sales catalogs into the state and had 
itself made sales there of approximately $1 million.  As a result, Quill itself was found to 
have “purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota…”185 Quill was not and could 
 
179 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). 
180 A subsidiary corporation's operations in North Carolina failed to establish due process nexus between 
North Carolina and the subsidiaries' parent corporation, i.e. its shareholder.  Separateness of the subsidiary 
was not a “pure fiction” and was respected.  Id. at 337. 
181 Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). 
182 Id. at 1366. For a well-reasoned analysis of the fallacies of nexus attribution, see Lowery and Vasquez, 
“When Is It Unconstitutional For States To Tax Nonresident Members of Limited Liability Companies?” 
State Tax Notes, May 19, 2003, at 633. 
183 See supra, Notes 28, et. seq. and accompanying text.  
184 See infra, Note 186. 
185 Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
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not be subjected to tax merely because North Dakota law applied to and benefited Quill’s 
customers or vendors and thereby indirectly benefited Quill. Such state benefits were not 
and could not be attributed to Quill.186 
B. Gavin’s Treatment of Trust Relationships as Forever Establishing Tax Jurisdiction 
Over the Trustee when Trustees, Trust Property, Trust Administration, and 
Applicable Trust Law were all Outside of Connecticut. 
State taxation of a trustee, whether the trust relationship was testamentary or inter 
vivos, must pass both the due process and commerce clause requirements established 
under Quill.  Even if the settlor resided in the taxing state, tax policies which create a risk 
of multiple taxation nevertheless discriminate against interstate commerce and are 
unconstitutional.187 
The Gavin opinion clearly recognized that taxation of a trustee when the trust 
relationship was actually established, governed, and administered under the taxing state’s 
applicable law was easily justified.188 
Taxation of the trustee of an inter vivos trust relationship established, governed, 
and administered outside the taxing state under laws of a foreign jurisdiction can hardly 
be justified on the same principles however.189 Likewise, testamentary trust 
relationships, like inter vivos trust relationships, can clearly be established, administered, 
 
186 Quill, citing Bellas Hess, focused on the taxpayer’s direct contacts with its North Dakota customers, not 
the mere fact that taxpayer had customers in the state.  Id. at 313.  Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
relied on similar, Gavin-like, general economic benefits and economic climate provided by its laws, Id. at 
304, but was reversed by the Supreme Court. 
187 See Part B.3. below.  
188 Gavin, at 200, citing District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank. 
189 See supra, Note 149. 
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and subject to laws of a foreign jurisdiction.190 Such testamentary trust relationships have 
no more contact with the jurisdiction of the Decedent’s domicile than a similar inter vivos 
trust relationship.191 
VII. Gavin’s Failed Commerce Clause Analysis 
As stated in Quill192 and Complete Auto,193 a state tax will be sustained under a 
Commerce Clause challenge194 only so long as the tax (1) is applied to an activity with 
substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to services provided by the state.195 
1. Substantial Nexus: Substantial nexus requires more than “minimum contacts”, 
“slightest presence”, or “minimal nexus” under due process.196 In Gavin, out-of-state 
banks, as trustees, had to have “a substantial nexus” with Connecticut in order for 
Connecticut to levy an income tax on such out-of-state trustees197. Yet, except in its due 
 
190 By default, i.e. by failure of the instrument to designate foreign law and foreign administration, District 
laws applied to the creation and administration of the trust in Chase.  See Notes 147 and 149. 
191 See supra Notes 40 - 46 and discussion of Shaffer, infra, Note 218. et seq. 
192 See supra Notes 149 - 151 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra Note 139 and accompanying text. 
194 The Commerce Clause's negative sweep is the source of limitations on a state's power to tax interstate 
transactions.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (stating, “[the Court’s] interpretation of the ‘negative’ or ‘dormant’ 
Commerce Clause has evolved substantially over the years, particularly as that Clause concerns limitations 
on state taxation powers”). 
195 Id. at 311 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279). 
196 Id. at 315 n.8.  
197 Only legal persons can have nexus, i.e. can direct their activities at the taxing state.  Trusts are not legal 
persons.  Trusts are merely abstract relationships between persons.  See supra, Note 30 et. seq. and 
accompanying text.  
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process analysis, Gavin makes no analysis whatsoever as to sufficiency of the out-of-state 
bank’s contacts as a trustee with the State of Connecticut.  As previously discussed198, the 
trustee’s contacts with Connecticut even failed the minimal due process nexus 
requirement.   
The Gavin opinion merely suggests that the out-of-state bank fails to address the 
four separate aspects of the Commerce Clause test.199 The opinion itself merely 
addressed whether risk of multiple taxation would unconstitutionally impact selection of 
out-of-state trustees as contrasted with domestic trustees not subject to such risk?200 
2. Fair Apportionment. Fair apportionment of the tax among states involved in 
the taxed activity is also required.201 As stated by the dissent in Gavin, Connecticut’s 
income tax is not apportioned at all.202 There was no tax credit available from 
Connecticut for the trustees’ taxes paid to New York.203 Apportionment requires a 
rational and measured fragmenting of the transaction or tax base so that each state taxes 
 
198 See supra, Notes 185 and 186. 
199 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 805. 
200 See infra, Note 204. 
201 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
202 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 808.  The trusts were all treated as “resident” trusts under Gavin, and residents are 
taxed on all income without allocation. Connecticut did not even allow tax credits. Id. at 786. 
203 Id. at 804.  The trustee and trust property were in New York and New York law applied to trust 
administration.  The inter vivos trust was formed under New York law. Also, see supra, Note 116 et. seq. 
and accompanying text. 
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only that part of the whole activity or base most closely related to such state.204 Gavin 
taxed all of the trustee’s income, not merely some apportioned part. 
Trust assets, administration, applicable laws, and trustees were all outside of 
Connecticut.  Nevertheless, the trustee was treated as a “resident” in Gavin, i.e. taxed on 
all their income, irrespective of the source of such income. 
Rational allocation has been attempted by many states in many ways.  The 
“UDITPA” applies uniform allocation rules to all signatory states.205 Under the UDITPA 
there are different allocations for business and for non-business206 income.  Sales of a 
business’s assets are allocated in one fashion and sale of its stock is allocated in 
another.207 Also, states such as New York have their own unique allocation rules.208 
Pass-through entities add another layer of complexity to the allocation confusion. 
 
204 In Taylor v. State Tax Commission, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), a testamentary trust was 
created by the will of a decedent who died while residing in New York.  The trust assets included real 
property in Florida.  Since Florida law prohibited a foreign corporation from acting as trustee over Florida 
property, decedent's sons were appointed as trustees of the Florida property.  The trust excluded capital 
gains from the Florida property when calculating its New York taxable income.  The court held that neither 
New York laws nor New York services were of benefit to the Florida property.  The court stated, "[t]he fact 
that the former owner of the property in question died while being domiciled in New York, making the trust 
a resident trust under New York tax law, is insufficient to establish a basis for jurisdiction".  Thus, new 
York taxation of gain on the Florida property violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
205 Unif. Div. Of Income for Tax Purposes Act. 
206 See, e.g., Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227 (Ala. 2000); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, 504 
U.S. 768 (1992). 
207 Mobile Oil v. Comm’r of Taxes, 455 U.S. 425 (1980). 
208 See N.Y. Tax Law §§210.3 and §§208.9. 
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Overly broad209 trustee nexus and residency statutes are sometimes referred to 
conservatively as Founder State Trusts.  Even if a trustee were a resident, the right of 
other states to tax income from sources within such other states must be recognized and 
adjustments made to avoid the risk of multiple tax burdens.210 
3. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce The principle focus of the Gavin 
opinion’s Commerce Clause analysis was whether or not a Connecticut “settlor would 
choose a Connecticut bank, over an out-of-state bank, as trustee solely because of the 
potential for future multiple taxation of some portion of the trust’s future income.”211 
The appropriate test, however, was whether or not the “practical effect” of the 
Connecticut tax was to “discriminate against interstate commerce.”212 
As noted, supra, the Gavin opinion stated, “although we agree that there are such 
incentives and risks, we conclude that they are too remote and speculative to constitute a 
dormant commerce clause violation.”213 The opinion found the speculative nature in the 
selection of a trustee from its belief that multiple and diverse factors214 would be 
 
209 “The Founder-State Trust is inconsistent with the relations of states of the American Union and with the 
reality, and realistic expectations, of the citizens of each state.”  Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, 
Interstate Style:  First Notes on a Theme from Saenz, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1240 (2002). 
210 See infra, Note 212..
211 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 806 (emphasis added). 
212 Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992). 
213 Id. at 805. See infra, Note 214 et. seq. and accompanying text. 
214 “The choice of bank as trustee is likely to be animated by many imponderables, among them: the prior 
experience of the testator or settlor; the financial performance of the various banks in the pool of available 
choices; the current location of the likely beneficiaries; the current location of the various banks in the pool; 
and, of course, the tax implication, if any.  We simply are not sufficiently persuaded of the underlying 
validity of the plaintiff’s assumption about how such a multifaceted decision as the choice of a trustee is 
likely to be made.” Id. at 806. 
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considered by a Connecticut settlor before selecting a trustee.  The Connecticut court 
found that its tax imposed on a foreign trustee would indeed subject the trust income to 
the risk of multiple taxation,215 a risk not shared by the domestic trustees.  Thus, even if a 
state tax created an undue burden on interstate commerce, the Gavin opinion would not 
find a Commerce Clause violation unless it could determine the precise role such tax 
played in commercial decisions of consumers of interstate products and services.  Indeed, 
the opinion stated that the adverse impact of the multiple taxes must be the “sole”216 
determinative factor on economic decisions affecting interstate commerce.  In summary, 
as well-stated by one commentator: 
“[I]f a state elects to attempt to tax income from trusts having contacts on 
which the Connecticut Supreme Court supported its tax …there are strong 
arguments to support a challenge to the enforceability of such tax.”217 
4. Relation to State Benefits Provided. Shaffer v. Heitner218 was decided by the 
Supreme Court in the same time frame as it decided Complete Auto.219 In Shaffer, the 
Supreme Court analyzed personal jurisdiction under the International Shoe220 due process 
standard.221 As part of the application of this standard, the Supreme Court also analyzed 
whether the minimum contacts of a party were related to the subject matter at issue.  In 
 
215 “[B]ecause the property of all of these trusts consisted only of cash and securities in the tax year in 
question, no credit would have been available to them under the current tax scheme.”  Id. at 804. 
216 See supra, Note 211. 
217 Guiterrez, Jr., The State Income Taxation of Multi-Jurisdictional Trusts, 36 Univ. of Miami Institute on 
Estate Planning §1309.2 (2002). 
218 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (June, 1977). 
219 See supra, Note 162. 
220 See supra, Note 157. 
221 "Minimum contacts" such as do not offend traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice".  See 
supra, Note 158 and Shaffer, 433 U.S., at 203 and 207. 
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essence, this became a second due process requirement.  “[T]here is no necessary 
relationship between holding a position as a corporate fiduciary [subject of the litigation] 
and owning stock or other interest in the corporation [parties’ sole due process contact 
with Delaware].222 The Supreme Court also directly rejected a state’s claim that benefits 
provided through application of state laws to an issue, necessarily gave the state 
jurisdiction over the parties associated with such issue.223 “The issue is personal 
jurisdiction, not choice of law.  It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the 
[appellants]”.224 
(1) Minimum contacts, and (2) relation of such contact to the subject 
matter at issue, i.e. production of income or subject matter of litigation.  In 
Heitner, parties had property in Delaware [thereby satisfying (1) above], 
but the property was not the subject matter of the litigation in which 
personal jurisdiction was sought [thereby, not satisfying (2) above].  
The Appellee’s discredited argument in Shaffer was much the same as Connecticut’s in 
Gavin: 
“[Appellee] notes that Delaware law provides substantial benefits to 
corporate officers and directors, and that . . . [it is] only fair and just to 
require Appellants, in return for these benefits to respond in the State of 
Delaware.”225 
But the Court absolutely rejected this general “legal benefits” argument and stated “this 
line of reasoning … does not demonstrate that Appellants have ‘purposefully availed 
 
222 Shaffer, at 214. 
223 Id, at 215. "[W]e have rejected the argument that if a state's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its 
courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute." 
224 Id, (citations omitted) [Emphasis added].  Quill, likewise, ignored general benefits derived from 
applicability of North Dakota law but focused instead on Quill's own acts directed at North Dakota.  See 
supra, Note 185.
225 Id, at 215-216 
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themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.’ Hanson v. 
Dencla, 357 U.S. 235, at 253.”226 
In Complete Auto’s four-part test for state taxation’s compliance with the 
Commerce clause, Steps One227 and Four essentially repeat this dual due process 
standard. Step One requires adequate nexus.228 Step Four requires the necessary 
relationship between state benefits provided and the subject of taxation.229 
Gavin wrongly held that the Connecticut law benefits afforded the Connecticut 
beneficiary230 subjected the nonresident trustee to Connecticut jurisdiction for due 
process purposes.  This analysis was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Shaffer231, whether the relationship to state services provided test is applied in the due 
process context or as Step Four in the Commerce Clause analysis.232 
226 Id, at 216 
227 See supra, Note 168.
228 Substantial v. Minimum Contacts.  See supra, Note 196.
229 See supra, Note 156. 
230 See supra, Note 173. Connecticut law did not benefit the earning of the income from trust property.  
Connecticut law merely protected the beneficiary’s receipt and enjoyment of income when distributed.   
231 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v Minnesota, 358 U.s. 450, 464 – 465 (1959), (taxes are 
“levied only on the portion of the taxpayer’s net income which arises from its activities within the taxing 
state”). 
232“Resident" Taxpayers:  Internal Consistency, due process, and State Income Taxation, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 
119, 141+ (1991) 
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VIII. The Importance of Roger John Traynor233 to the Analysis of both McCulloch and 
Gavin
Justice Roger John Traynor was among the most influential and highly esteemed 
jurists and legal scholars of the twentieth century.234 From 1928 to 1940, Professor 
Traynor served as tax advisor to the California Board of Equalization where he was 
responsible for complete reform of California’s sales and use tax, personal income tax, 
and corporate franchise taxes. He took a leave of absence in 1937 to serve at the U.S. 
Treasury Department to help Treasury draft the Revenue Act of 1938. He served as 
associate justice of the California Supreme Court from 1940-1964, serving as Chief 
Justice from 1964-1970.    
Among his prolific writings, Professor Traynor authored the classic insightful 
article, “State Taxation of Trust Income.”235 As associate justice of the California 
Supreme Court, he was in the majority of the Supreme Court of California on its 
McCulloch opinion.  Indeed, the special California statutes236 analyzed in McCulloch 
 
233 Professor of Law, University of California, Advisor to the California State Board of Equalization.  He 
“played an important role in drafting important [California] tax laws.”  National Tax Association Tax 
Conference, Indianapolis, Indiana, September 29, 1936 @ 157. . .. 
234In his writing and jurisprudence, he established national legal principles of product liability with strict 
liability; extension of strict product liability through the distribution chain; action for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress; “moderate and restrained” doctrine in conflict of laws; the fiduciary obligation owed 
by majority shareholders to minority shareholders; admission of custom and practice evidence in contract 
litigation; the “exclusionary rule” barring improperly obtained evidence; abolition of sovereign immunity; 
no fault divorce through elimination of defense of recrimination; abolishment of laws prohibiting 
miscegenation; and citation of law review articles in  judicial decisions. See generally, “Roger John 
Traynor”, Legal Encyclopedia, published by Thomson & Gale; West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 
The Gale Group, Inc. 1998. Answers.com 13 Mar 2006. http://www.answers.com. Also see Friendly, 
“Ablest Judge of His Generation,” 71 Cal L R 1039-1044 (No. 4, July 1983); White, “Introduction” in The 
Traynor Reader: A Collection of Essays by the Honorable Roger J. Traynor, ( San Francisco: The Hastings 
Law Journal, Hastings College of the Law, 1987)(http://uchastings.edu/?pid=1408) 
235 Roger John Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOWA L. REV. 268 (1937).  
236 See supra, Notes 195 - 199 and accompanying text. 
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reflected in detail the views expressed by Professor Traynor in his early article dealing 
with state taxation of trustees, beneficiaries, and settlor/grantors.237 
Traynor’s article first analyzed settled law on state taxation of residents and 
nonresidents. He discussed a state’s right to tax domestic trustees on all their accumulated 
income whether earned within or without its borders.238 He also acknowledged the right 
of a state to tax all income earned within its borders by nonresident trustees, thereby 
resulting in two states possibly taxing the same income.239 Likewise, he discussed the 
well-established right of a state to tax resident beneficiaries upon distributions of current 
income. 
Traynor’s article, however, then focused on how the complexity of trusts had 
created obstacles to a state’s ability to tax accumulated trust income. Nonresident, 
complex trusts located in states selected for minimum taxation could and were being used 
to shelter income. Through accumulation of income by a nonresident trustee, the state of 
the beneficiary’s residence could be prevented from taxing such income. Simmon240 
237 Indeed, McCulloch cites Professor Traynor’s article in FN9. '(W)hile the complexity of the trust itself 
and of the relations of the parties thereto complicates the problem of effective taxation, it should not 
obstruct the claims of a state to tax trust income, so far as possible, as it income is accorded of a trust. 
Trust income is accorded protection in its production, receipt and enjoyment to the same extent as other 
income; it measures in like manner ability to pay. It measures in like manner ability far as possible upon 
the same basis. If the obstacles interposed by the trust device are to be circumvented, jurisdiction to tax 
should be found wherever substantial claims to tax are reinforced by effective power to compel payment.' 
(Emphasis added.) Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income (1937) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 268, 271- 272.  Power 
to collect is an essential element of tax jurisdiction.
238 Traynor, supra Note 235.  
239 Id. Former §17980, renumbered today as §18005, provides a credit for trustee taxes paid to its state of 
domicile, e.g. Missouri, against California taxes paid by the beneficiary on the same income. Though the 
McCulloch opinion doesn’t mention availability of the credit, §18005 provides a credit to the beneficiary 
for taxes the trustee paid on the same income to Missouri, thereby properly minimizing taxation of the 
same income by two different states.  
240 See supra, Note 73
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clearly reflected how a subsequent distribution of previously accumulated trust income 
could also avoid taxation by the beneficiary’s state of residence depending on a state’s 
principal and income statutes applicable to trusts.  
Professor Traynor’s article explored ways in which such states could tax such 
accumulated income within the bounds of due process. Clearly Traynor felt and stated 
that a state’s “jurisdiction to tax should be found wherever [1] substantial claims to tax 
are reinforced by [2] effective power to compel payment.”241 “Substantial claims to tax” 
refers to the state’s due process nexus to the income.  “Effective power to compel 
payment” refers to in personam jurisdiction over the taxpayer in order to compel his tax 
payment.  “The power to tax is empty without the power to collect the tax; hence the 
power to collect is a necessary predicate to a state’s power to tax.”242 Traynor then 
analyzed the due process quandary of how to tax a foreign trustee’s accumulated income 
when a taxing state lacked due process nexus with the trustee and current income was not 
being distributed to its resident beneficiary.. 
His solution was that such a state should tax its own residents, whether settlor or 
beneficiary, not the foreign trustee who lacked nexus with the taxing state.243 
Traynor proposed taxing a resident settlor pursuant to Grantor trust principles, 
though grantor trust laws244 were not enacted for another 20 years.  Regarding beneficiary 
 
241 See supra, 237. 
242 See Lowy supra, Note 54.  “Power” to collect tax, i.e. personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer, pairs the 
jurisdiction to tax with in rem or in personam jurisdiction.  
243 Clearly, Traynor was analyzing circumstances in which the trustee, settlor, and beneficiary lived in 
different states, and trust income was accumulated, not distributed. Id at 274 (“… the various parties are 
domiciled in different states”).  
244 Id at 284 – 291. 
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taxation, Traynor stated, “if a tax is effectively to reach such income, and thereby the 
recipient’s ability to pay, it must be imposed at the domicile of the beneficiary when the 
income is currently distributable.”245 Traynor was proposing a system of beneficiary 
taxation upon distribution of accumulated income 20 years prior to enactment of the 
federal throw back rules which were later enacted based on his tax principles.246 
Traynor recognized that the state of a beneficiary’s residence was limited (1) to 
taxation of its resident beneficiary, and (2) to imposing such a tax only when the income 
was distributable.247 Traynor’s position is absolutely clear and diametrically opposed to 
Connecticut taxing the New York trustee based solely on the domicile of the beneficiary: 
The state of either the Settlor’s or the beneficiary’s domicile would 
likewise have difficulty in collecting a tax from a non-resident trustee on 
income which was neither produced, received nor enjoyed within its 
borders during the period of accumulation . . .. 248 
245 Traynor at 275, supra, Note 237. (Emphasis added).  Traynor opposed taxing the entire accumulated 
income to the California beneficiary solely in the year of distribution since progressive rate schedules 
would impose an inappropriate tax burden on such beneficiary.  Thus, following Traynor’s philosophy, the 
beneficiary’s tax was calculated separately for each year of accumulation under §17745(d). See supra, Note 
275. 
246“The throwback rules of §§ 665 through 668 taxed distributions of accumulated 
income by a complex trust roughly as though they had been distributed to the 
beneficiaries in earlier years, with credit for taxes paid by the trust when it reported the 
income. The throwback rules were intended to curb use of accumulation trusts as tax-
avoidance devices.” Bittker and Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶
81.5. 
247 Infra, Note 249 
248 Id. at 288.  Again “power” to collect tax is an essential element of jurisdiction to tax.  Traynor 
recognized there was no personal jurisdiction, i.e. no power, to collect the tax from a nonresident trustee.  
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Traynor was also concerned about the validity under state law to tax the resident 
beneficiary on accumulated trust income even when distributed. 249 The issue, as in 
Simmon, was whether state principal and income laws permitted taxation of the 
distribution as “income.”  His concern was based on the trust’s accumulated income 
having blended with principal and having become a nontaxable gift, bequest, or return of 
capital when later distributed. 250 
The foregoing concerns, along with others,251 and the analysis of Professor 
Traynor were addressed and reflected in the unique California Statute252 analyzed in 
McCulloch.253 As Advisor to the California State Board of Equalization,254 it is likely 
Professor Traynor participated in drafting the unique California statutes modeled after his 
own proposals.  First, Professor Traynor’s analysis of the constitutional power “to compel 
payments”255 by the state of the settlor’s and beneficiaries’ residence resulted in a tax 
 
249 There are Constitutional “realization” issues in taxing a beneficiary prior to actual distribution, assuming 
the beneficiary cannot control distribution.  If the beneficiary controls distribution, constructive receipt 
satisfies realization.  See Glenshaw Glass, supra, Note 78. 
250 “The validity of such a tax would depend largely upon the theories with regard to the nature of capital 
and income.  Thus, in Commissioner v. Simmon, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held invalid an income 
tax regulation making accumulated income taxable to the resident beneficiary when received from a 
nonresident trustee on the ground that such accumulated income constituted 'capital' and not 'income' in the 
hands of the beneficiary.” Id. at 281 (footnote omitted).  Simmon is discussed supra, Note 78. 
251 Professor Traynor also raised the concern that taxation of a lump sum on distribution would throw 
income into higher brackets than imposition of an annual tax on smaller, annual income.  Id. at 280-81.  
Taxing income annually, as was done in McCulloch, is required by the California statute. McCulloch v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1964). 
252See infra, Note 272 
253See supra, Note 23 
254 See supra Note 235 and infra, Note 283. 
255 Absence of “power” to compel payment from the nonresident trustee equates to lack of in personam 
jurisdiction over such nonresident trustee.                
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actually imposed on a California resident beneficiary.256 Likewise, the constitutional 
issue of realization257 resulted in California delaying taxation until income was actually 
distributed to the resident beneficiary. The state statutory issue of capital vs. income258 
was addressed by revising California’s principal and income statutes.259 Double taxation 
criticism under the Commerce Clause was satisfied by allowing the beneficiary a tax 
credit for taxes paid by the trustee to its state of residence.260 
The discussion below reflects that Traynor’s theories were reflected and 
implemented in the California statutes and in the McCulloch opinion.  The opinion noted 
that the tax was actually imposed on the California resident beneficiary, not the foreign 
trustee. The tax was calculated on each year’s annual income, not on the accumulated 
lump sum actually distributed.  The beneficiary’s obligation to pay was postponed until 
actual distribution.  The beneficiary absolutely did not pay the tax previously levied 
against the trustee.   
As stated in §17745(d), “The tax attributable to the inclusion of that distributed 
income in the gross income of that beneficiary for the year…had it been includable in the 
gross income of the beneficiary ratably …for the period that the trust accumulated or 
acquired income for that contingent beneficiary…”261 
256 See supra, Note 273 and §17745, subsection (a).
257 Glenshaw Glass, supra, Note 78. 
258 See discussion of Simmon, supra, Note 73. 
259 Cal. Rev. and Tax Code, §17745(c).  
260 Supra, Note 239. 
261 Clearly this statute was the predecessor and model for the federal throwback rules. See supra Note 246. 
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The McCulloch opinion and Professor Traynor’s article stand for the clear 
proposition that a state of the settlor’s or beneficiary’s residence cannot constitutionally 
tax a foreign trustee.  Gavin’s citation of McCulloch as authority was wholly misplaced. 
 
IX. McCulloch Is Not Precedent for Gavin.
McCulloch262 is the only case the Gavin opinion even attempted to claim as 
precedent for its holding as to Connecticut’s taxation of the New York inter vivos trustee.  
Gavin mischaracterized McCulloch as “a closely analogous”263 case. McCulloch is not 
closely analogous to Gavin on its facts, on applicable law, or on its holding.  As analyzed 
below, McCulloch in no way established even the slenderest precedential thread for 
Gavin’s wholly unprecedented holding. 
On the facts, McCulloch was an action to recover income taxes assessed against 
and previously paid by plaintiff, a California resident who was both a trustee264 and 
beneficiary of a foreign trust.265 The California resident was one of three trustees.266 
Pursuant to a very unique California statute,267 the beneficiary had paid the California tax 
 
262 See supra, Note 23. 
263 Gavin, supra, Note 6. 
264 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §17743 (West 1994) (stating, “[w]here the taxability of income under this 
chapter depends on the residence of the fiduciary and there are two or more fiduciaries for the trust, the 
income taxable under Section 17742 shall be apportioned according to the number of fiduciaries resident in 
this state pursuant to rules and regulations prescribed by the Franchise Tax Board”). One-third was an 
allocable portion in McCulloch.
265 McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 414-15 (Cal. 1964).  The testamentary trust was formed 
and administered under the laws of the state of Missouri under the will of a Missouri decedent.  Id. at 415. 
266 Id. at 414.  In Gavin, no trustee was a resident of Connecticut. 
267 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 17742 et. seq. (West 1994).  See infra, 271.  Connecticut had no similar 
statute and the California statute was essential to taxation of the California beneficiary in McCulloch.
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levied on such resident beneficiary.268 The California beneficiary’s California tax was 
calculated by inclusion of income distributed from the nonresident trustee in the 
transferee beneficiary’s personal tax return.269 
McCulloch was more closely analogous to Simmon270 than Gavin, except that 
California had a statute271 which had no equivalent in Massachusetts, Connecticut, or 
anywhere else.  The provisions currently in effect are found in sections 17742 through 
17746 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code.272 
268 McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 415. 
269 Section 17745(d) taxed the beneficiary anew on the distributed "income" and never makes the 
beneficiary liable as a transferee for the unpaid taxes of the foreign trustee.  See infra, Notes 273 and 284. 
270 See supra, Note 73. 
271 Section 18102 (now §17742) provided as follows:  
Except as otherwise provided in Articles 2 and 4 of this chapter, the income of an estate 
or trust is taxable to the estate or trust [nevertheless, See Section 18106 below and infra, Note 
Error! Bookmark not defined.273. The tax applies to the entire net income of an estate, if the 
decedent was a resident, regardless of the residence of the fiduciary or beneficiary, and to the 
entire net income of a trust, if the fiduciary or beneficiary is a resident, regardless of the residence 
of the settlor.   
Section 18103 read as follows:  
Where the taxability of income of a trust depends on the residence of the fiduciary and 
there are two or more fiduciaries for the trust, the income taxable under Section 18102 shall be 
apportioned according to the number of fiduciaries resident in this State pursuant to rules and 
regulations prescribed by the commissioner.  
Section 18105 provided in part:   “[t]axes on income of an estate or trust which is taxable to the estate or 
trust . . . shall be paid by the fiduciary.”   
Yet, when such tax was not paid by the trustee, section 18106 [renumbered §17745] imposed personal 
liability for taxes on trust income on the resident beneficiary to include such income in the beneficiary’s tax 
return when the income was distributed.  See McCulloch at 640-641, and infra Note 273. 
272 Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 17742-17746 (West 1994). 
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Section 17745273 is entitled “Income Taxable to Beneficiaries.”  The title “Income 
Taxable to Beneficiaries” is clearly an irrefutable declaration that “income” is taxable to 
the “beneficiary.”  Section 17745 specifically provides as follows:   
(a) If, for any reason, the taxes imposed on income of a trust which is taxable to 
the trust because the fiduciary or beneficiary is a resident of this state are not paid 
when due and remain unpaid when that income is distributable to the beneficiary, 
. . . if the taxes are not paid when due, such income shall be taxable to the 
beneficiary when distributable to him. . . 
 
(d) The tax attributable to the inclusion of that income in the gross income of 
that beneficiary for the year . . . shall be the aggregate of the taxes which would 
have been attributable to that income had it been included in the gross income of
that beneficiary ratably for the year of distribution and the five preceding taxable 
years, or for the period that the trust accumulated or acquired income for that 
contingent beneficiary, whichever period is the shorter. (Emphasis added)  
There are two reasons why the beneficiary is taxed on the distributed income but 
spread over the years the trust had realized such income. First and foremost, it’s a 
mechanism preferred by Professor Traynor for reducing the tax penalty on the 
beneficiary.274 The penalty arose from taxing five or more years of income accumulation 
to the beneficiary in a single year.275 
Secondly, when a trust accumulates income, generally the trust is taxed and not 
the beneficiary. When the accumulated funds are later distributed to the beneficiary, 
federal and state tax law treats the income as having been inextricably commingled with 
 
273 West's Ann. Cal. Rev. & T. Code § 17745. 
 
274 Substantially the same approach was utilized in the federal throwback rules where a complex trust was 
used to shelter income. See infra, Note 284 
275 This statute deliberately reflects the sentiment expressed by Professor Roger Traynor in his classic tax 
article (See infra, Note 235) that the trust income distributed should not be included in the aggregate on the 
beneficiary's tax return for the year of distribution. Due to progressive rate schedules, taxing the income 
from years of trust accumulation to the beneficiary entirely in the year of distribution would constitute a tax 
penalty on the beneficiary who exercised no control over the trust's decision to accumulate. 
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and become a part of nontaxable trust principal.276 This tax principle “would prevent 
taxation of accumulated income when received by the beneficiary.  This would in effect 
obstruct taxation of such income altogether whenever it were derived from intangibles, in 
view of the difficulties in reaching either of the other parties [settlor or trustee].”  Having 
a statute that levies, but does not collect, a tax on the beneficiary during each year the 
trust has income avoids a later argument by the beneficiary that he or she can’t be taxed 
in the year of distribution since the previously accumulated income might now constitute 
principal under state law.277 
This second purpose is also clearly reflected in §17745, subsection (c), which 
appears to be a direct reaction to the holding in Simmon,278 as follows: 
(c) The tax on that income which is taxable to the beneficiary under subdivisions 
(a) or (b) is a tax on the receipt of that income distributed or on the constructive 
receipt of that distributable income. For purposes of this section income 
accumulated by a trust continues to be income even though the trust provides that 
the income (ordinary or capital) shall become a part of the corpus. (Emphasis 
added.)  
 
The McCulloch279 opinion did only what the statute mandated, no more and no 
less. In McCulloch, no tax levied on the nonresident trustee was ever paid by anyone.280 
No such tax was paid by the trustee.  Nor was any such tax on the nonresident trustee 
ever paid by the California resident beneficiary. Rather, the California resident 
 
276 See discussion of Simmon, supra Note 73 and accompanying text. See infra, Note 283. 
277 Id. This is a state principal and income statutory issue, not a constitutional question.  The 
plaintiff/beneficiary in McCulloch unsuccessfully made this argument.  
278 See supra, Note 73 
279 See supra, Note 23. 
280 Infra, Note 283. 
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beneficiary paid only a separate and distinct tax calculated on the pass through of the 
trust’s income to and inclusion with the beneficiary’s other taxable income and 
deductions.281 Eminent academic commentators clearly disagree.282 
In McCulloch, a Missouri trustee earned, but accumulated, income each year from 
1946 through 1950.  “The trust paid state income taxes to Missouri upon its income for 
the years 1946 to 1950 inclusive; it paid no income tax to California during that period.” 
283 California “imposed upon plaintiff [beneficiary] liability for income taxes upon the 
accumulated income [subsequently] distributed by the trust …”284 
In 1951, when the terminal distribution was made to the California beneficiary, 
California, then and only then, levied a separate income tax on the beneficiary.285 The 
 
281 See supra, Note 273.  
282 3 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation (2005), ¶ 20.09, states as follows: "Finally, the 
California Supreme Court relied on the presence of an in-state beneficiary to sustain the state's power to tax 
a trust, created by a nonresident decedent and administered outside the state, on income it was 
accumulating for the in-state beneficiary. The trust, which was administered in Missouri, had failed to pay 
taxes to California on the accumulated income, and, upon distribution of the accumulated income to the 
beneficiary, the beneficiary became liable for the trust's tax." (Emphasis added).  
 
Again, the beneficiary did not "become liable for the trust's tax" as it would have if the statute had actually 
provided for a "transferee tax." Instead, the beneficiary became liable for the beneficiary's own tax on 
income passed-through from the trust. 
 
283 McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 416.  “Since the trust failed to pay this state’s tax upon its annual income, 
California can constitutionally tax the beneficiary at the time he receives the accumulated income; …” Id.
at 414-15 (emphasis added).   
284 Id. at 415. The statute was the predecessor of the federal “throwback rules” imposing a tax directly on 
the beneficiary at the time of distribution. See e.g. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §665.  California’s very unique 
tax on the beneficiary of a trust is not a typical transferee tax provision. Indeed, it is a misnomer to describe 
it as a “transferee tax” at all. In actuality, it is merely a new direct tax on the trust beneficiary as the result 
of trust income being distributed, i.e., “transferred to,” and taxed directly to such beneficiary. For typical 
transferee tax  liability, see e.g.,  §26 U.S.C.A. 6901 (Transferee of property is liable for Transferor's 
unpaid income and/or transfer taxes plus a pro rata portion of any interest owed by Transferor thereon to 
the extent of FMV of property received from the Transferor.) 
285 Ca. Rev. & Tax Code, §17745(a), “… such income shall be taxable to the beneficiary when distributable 
to him.” 
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tax calculation and its collection clearly and deliberately fell solely on the California 
beneficiary, not the Missouri trustee.286 
Although the statute ostensibly undertook to initially tax the foreign trustee on its 
undistributed annual income in 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, both the statute and the 
Supreme Court of California ultimately placed the real tax burden on the California 
beneficiary.287 
The California Supreme Court in its McCulloch opinion, clearly and correctly 
held that the residence of a beneficiary of a foreign trust was a sufficient basis for 
California to tax such California resident beneficiary.288 As noted by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in Gavin, “[w]e agree with the reasoning of the California Supreme Court 
that ‘the laws of the state of residence afford benefit and protection to the resident 
beneficiary [no reference to the foreign fiduciary]....’”289 Further, the Gavin opinion also 
correctly agreed with the California Supreme Court’s statement in McCulloch that:  
The tax imposed by California upon the beneficiary [no reference to the 
foreign trustee] is constitutionally supported by a sufficient connection 
with, and protection afforded to, [the] plaintiff as such beneficiary . . .
California grants the beneficiary [no reference to  the foreign trustee] the 
interim protection of its laws so that he [the beneficiary] may ultimately 
obtain the benefit of the accumulated income . . . [The] [p]laintiff’s 
[Beneficiary’s] residence here confers the essential minimum connection 
… necessary for due process of law, [i.e., unquestionably satisfies due 
 
286 See supra, Notes 273 and 283 and accompanying text.
287 The opinion did not require the beneficiary to pay the trust’s tax or associated interest for late payments 
back to 1946.  
288 McGuire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920) (holding that Massachusetts can tax its resident beneficiary on 
distributed current income from a Pennsylvania trust).  See Walter L. Nossaman, State Taxation of Income,
24 CAL. L. REV. 524 (1936). 
289 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 802 (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 412). 
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process for taxation of the resident California or Connecticut beneficiary, 
but does not support taxation of the foreign trustee in either case].290 
The Gavin opinion then jumps from Connecticut’s right to tax its own resident 
beneficiary as in McCulloch, to claim a state’s right to tax a foreign trustee who has no 
connection, minimum or otherwise, with the State of Connecticut.291 This is an 
unsustainable and utterly indefensible leap in logic.   
This flawed logic then led the Supreme Court of Connecticut to make its decision 
to disregard a contradictory, but well-reasoned, body of precedent.  As the Gavin opinion 
itself stated in footnote 25, “[w]e disagree, therefore, with the reasoning of those cases 
relied on by the plaintiff in which courts have found the domicile of a beneficiary of an 
inter vivos trust insufficient for due process purposes.”292 Courts have long held that the 
domicile of a beneficiary was an insufficient contact to satisfy due process requirements 
for taxation of an otherwise foreign trustee.293 
The McColloch opinion clearly addressed “due process” from the standpoint of 
California’s imposing a tax on its own resident beneficiary just as Missouri had properly 
taxed the trustee resident in Missouri: 
We find no reason in constitutional principles or in practical application . . 
. why the tax [on the beneficiary] founded upon the residence of the 
beneficiary should not be sustained.  We shall point out that just as the 
 
290 Id. (emphasis added) (3rd & 7th alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 412). 
291 The mere attributed benefit of Connecticut law is insufficient for either due process or commerce clause 
purposes.  See Shaeffer supra, Note 283.  Of course, a beneficiary’s residence in a state supports taxation of 
such resident beneficiary.  This is all the California Supreme Court did in McCulloch.
292 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 802 n.25.  The court refers to Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1990); Potter v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co. v. Murphy, 203 N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). Id.
293 See supra, Part III. B., and Simmon, supra, Note 73.  
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protection and benefits afforded by the state of the residence of the trustee 
[e.g., Missouri]294 serve as the basis for the constitutionality of the 
[Missouri] tax as to him, so do those factors serve as the basis for the 
constitutionality of the [California] tax as to the beneficiary.295 
In McCulloch, Missouri taxed its trustee.  In like manner, California imposed a 
tax on its resident California beneficiary.  The opinion, like §18106,296 repeatedly made it 
clear that California’s tax was ultimately on the beneficiary:  
We conclude that California could constitutionally tax plaintiff as 
the resident beneficiary upon the accumulated income when it was 
distributed to him.297 (Emphasis added) 
Connecticut in Gavin and Massachusetts in Simmon, unlike California in 
McCulloch, lacked a state statute to impose a tax on the Connecticut or Massachusetts 
beneficiary, respectively, upon receipt of the trust’s accumulated income.  
The Gavin opinion engaged in a logical disconnect by holding that since 
Connecticut could298, but statutorily did not, tax the Connecticut beneficiary; it had nexus 
 
294 With one of three trustees resident in California, California could have imposed a pro rata one-third tax 
based on trustee residence in California.  See supra, Note 271 re former §18103. 
295 McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 418 (emphasis added).  The tax imposed by California upon the beneficiary is 
constitutionally supported by a sufficient connection with, and protection afforded to, plaintiff as such 
beneficiary.  The state of residence of a trustee can tax, i.e., can have minimum contacts to tax, the trustee’s 
income.   
296 §18106 has been renumbered as §17745. See supra, Note 273 and accompanying text of subsections (a) 
and (d).
297 McCulloch, at 420-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
298 Under Due Process, Connecticut “could” have taxed its resident beneficiary upon distribution. Under 
Connecticut state statutes, however, Connecticut, like Massachusetts in Simmon, could not tax the resident 
on the distribution of accumulated income.   
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to tax the foreign trustee.  Therein lies the fundamental and very dangerous flaw in the 
opinion’s unprecedented holding.299 
X. Pre- and Post-Gavin State Residency Rules for Trustees
States have historically applied myriad nexus rules to trustee taxation.300 
California’s approach, established statutorily and judicially upheld by Professor Roger 
John Traynor, was discussed above.301 Idaho, similar to Missouri in Swift,302 taxes 
“trusts” as residents if they satisfy at least three out of five (six in Swift) characteristics:303 
A New York “resident” trust, i.e., created by a New York resident settlor, is a 
nonresident trust for income tax purposes if “(1) all trustees are domiciled in a state other 
than New York;304 (2) the entire corpus of the trust, including real and tangible personal 
property, is located outside of New York State [non-business intangibles deemed located 
outside the state]; and (3) all income and gains of the trust are derived from, or connected 
with, sources outside of New York State.”305 New Jersey has a similar standard.  “If a 
 
299 Attribution to the nonresident of benefits of Connecticut law to the Connecticut beneficiary was rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Shaffer, since the necessary relationship to the fiduciary's income earned in New 
York was insufficient for both due process (Shaffer) and commerce clause (Complete Auto, Step Four) 
purposes.  See supra, Note 283. 
300 Nenno and Sparks,  Delaware Dynasty Trusts, Total Return Trusts, and Asset Protection Trusts, printed 
by Wilmington Trust Bank. 
301 See discussion supra Part VII. 
302 Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). 
303See supra, Note 146   
304 See, e.g., In re John Frankel Trust, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 39 (New York State Tax Commission) 
(holding that a trust created by New York resident and administered under Connecticut law could be taxed 
as “resident” New York trust where majority of trustees were New York residents). 
305 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.23 (2003). 
57
resident trust or estate does not have any assets in New Jersey or income from New 
Jersey sources, and does not have any trustees or executors in New Jersey, it is not 
subject to New Jersey tax.”306 
At least one nationally respected Connecticut commentator, Mr. Frank Berall,307 
at the time of the adoption of Connecticut’s current income tax on trusts, analyzed 
Connecticut’s tax statute as being in the mainstream.308 In many respects, Mr. Berall 
stated parallels between New York and Connecticut law as follows: 
A resident trust will not be taxed if all its trustees are nonresidents, its 
entire corpus is located outside Connecticut and all its income and gains 
are derived from or connected with sources outside Connecticut.309 
Anticipating the Gavin issue, though not its holding, Mr. Berall further stated: 
The fact that such a trust still has resident beneficiaries should not make it 
a resident trust.  A tax cannot be imposed by Connecticut merely because 
trust beneficiaries reside here, if the trust’s assets are possessed by a 
trustee in another state; otherwise it would violate the due process
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.310 
306 Form NJ-1041, Instructions, 2002 New Jersey Gross Income Tax Fiduciary Return. 
307 Frank S. Berall, formerly of the Hartford Bar and former frequent national lecturer on income taxation 
of trusts and on estate planning. 
308 Frank S. Berall & Suzanne Brown Walsh, Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 65 CONN. B.J. 377 
(1991). 
309Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
310 Id. (emphasis added) (citing  Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938); Mercantile Safe-Deposit and Trust Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
19 A.D.2d 765 (3rd Dept. 1963). These cases were rejected by the Gavin opinion’s wholly unprecedented 
holding.  See supra Note 262 and accompanying text. 
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It seems that local politics and desperation for more state revenue have contributed to the 
dangerous, unprecedented holding of Gavin.311 
Conclusion
The result in Gavin is not consistent with the relations of states within the 
American Union or with the expectations of U.S. citizens.312 Instead of butchering 
constitutional limitations on state taxation of foreign trustees, whether testamentary or 
inter vivos, states should merely review and revise their own rules on taxation of grantors, 
trustees, and beneficiaries. 
Unconstitutionally expansive Founder State Trust rules are not the answer.  Like 
Justice Traynor, states should look to adoption and/or modification of traditional federal 
grantor trust rules and throwback rules.  Too many states merely conform their grantor 
 
311 The same pressures can be seen in Alabama’s new resident trust tax statute.  HB19 was part of a 
comprehensive trust tax reform package enacted by the Alabama legislature. HB19 defined a resident trust 
as a trust that is described in either (a) or (b) below:   
(a) A trust: (1) Created by the will of a decedent who was an Alabama resident at 
death or . . . who was an Alabama resident [including seven-month nondomiciliary 
resident] at the time the trust became irrevocable; and (2) For more than seven 
months during the taxable year, an individual who either resides in [nondomiciliary 
resident] or is domiciled in Alabama is either a fiduciary of the trust or a beneficiary 
to whom distributions may currently be made.  [OR] (b) a trust that has Alabama as 
its principal place of administration during the taxable year. 
Clearly, a nondomiciliary resident could meet the requirements of both (a)(1) and (a)(2).  A Florida 
domiciliary could, for example, have established a Florida or a Delaware trust and a permissive beneficiary 
of such a trust.  A clear example could be a Delaware self-funded spendthrift trust.  If, for unrelated 
business reasons, the Florida resident spent seven months in Alabama and either died in an auto crash or for 
some other reason the trust became irrevocable, the Delaware trust of a Florida resident with a Delaware 
trustee is forever an Alabama resident trust. 
Tying taxation solely to trust administration is similarly flawed.  A Texas resident could establish a trust 
with the Texas affiliate of an Alabama bank holding company.  If, wholly unbeknownst to the Texas 
settlor, all the holding company’s trust administration is conducted at its Alabama headquarters, the trust 
will be taxed forever as a resident Alabama trust. 
312 See Jacob, supra, Note 5. 
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trust rules to federal grantor trust rules.  Under I.R.C. § 679, the federal government taxes 
a U.S. citizen on all income of a foreign, i.e., outside the U.S., trust that has a U.S. 
beneficiary and was established by the U.S. grantor.  A state which conformed to federal 
grantor trust rules, could, under its counterpart of Section 679, tax its citizen grantors on 
trusts they might establish in Bermuda as a tax haven.  However, if the same state 
resident grantor created a similar trust in Delaware as a state tax haven, it is not a 
“grantor” trust for federal purposes or for conforming state law purposes. 
States like Connecticut that are interested in taxing income placed in out-of-state 
trusts by Connecticut residents, should establish grantor trust rules which parallel § 679, 
but which define a “foreign” trust as being established and domiciled outside the state of 
Connecticut, not merely outside the U.S.  This approach does, of course, subject the 
trust’s income to the risk double taxation which should be mitigated by income allocation 
or tax credits as required by Complete Auto’s commerce clause analysis. 
Likewise, states like Connecticut, that want to tax a foreign trustee’s accumulated 
income based on the state’s benefits provided to the trust’s beneficiary, should adopt laws 
similar to California’s throwback rules.  Such laws could parallel federal throwback rules 
which were in turn based on California’s Traynor tax model. Throwback rules would 
impose the state income tax on its resident beneficiary at the time of a subsequent 
distribution.  Today, under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, federal “throwback rules” 
apply primarily to foreign, i.e. non-U.S., trusts.313 The federal rationale and need of the 
 
313 26 U.S.C.  
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throwback rules for foreign trust taxation serves essentially the same remedial purpose 
states need to apply to out-of-state trusts with resident beneficiaries.314 
Gavin is a badly flawed ruling which, in most respects, has no precedent 
whatsoever.  It was founded on state desperation for revenues and local politics by 
reflecting the tax adage “Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax the fella behind the tree.”  In 
Gavin, the “you” and the “me” are Connecticut resident settlor’s and beneficiaries, and 
the “fella behind the tree”, is a nonresident trustee. 
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